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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
1.1 Prologue
Efficient allocation of limited resources is the crucial challenge for any economy. Financial
capital must be optimally matched with investment opportunity. Doing so would require a
venue where suppliers and consumers of capital can meet, in short, a financial market.
However, informational asymmetries and agency issues impede the allocation process.
One of the parties involved in the supply or consumption of financial capital, usually the
latter, may be better informed and reluctant to disclose the superior information. This
places the suppliers of capital at a considerable disadvantage. To optimally match capital
with investment opportunity, the participants require a market not impaired by severe
informational asymmetries or agency conflicts. The efficient exchange of capital depends
on vehicles or financial instruments that effect the smooth transference of capital, and a
market that accurately discovers the prices of these securities. Price discovery requires
firstly that information be produced and secondly that this information be efficiently
distributed to all participants in a timely fashion. In essence, the efficacy of price discovery
reveals how effectively new information is incorporated into prices.
An important question, then, is what affects price discovery as the fundamental function of
a market? Of particular interest is how competition affects price discovery. Over time, the
number of markets has increased, giving investors greater choice of trading venues. This
raises the question of whether such proliferation has improved price discovery. That is, are
1
the different markets introducing new information and thus contributing to price discovery,
or are most of them, just following a dominant market. Since arbitrage keeps the prices in
these markets close to each other, it is possible to examine this issue through cointegration
analysis. Several researchers have examined this issue of quote or trade quality in different
markets. The results have shown that most new markets do contribute information, but in
general the NYSE dominates.
Of course, one possible reason for varying contributions to price discovery from different
markets is the cross sectional differences in their design. In broad design, markets resemble
each other. The rules and regulations governing trade, such as tick-size, are uniform
across markets. For the most part, these rules, like the minimum tick-size, are arbitrary
and have evolved from the exigencies of actual trade. However, markets do institute
some minor changes that are unique to each market, e.g., transaction costs may differ as
markets compete to attract order flow. Rules that regulate trading vary across markets,
for example the current NYSE circuit-breaker rules, are the result of the market crash of
1987. Not all rules are self imposed. The bitter experience of the crash of 1927 made
it necessary to impose regulations to ensure against market failure and to curb some of
the more egregious excesses of the participants. New regulations had to be imposed
or old ones amended to meet the requirements of a changing environment. Some of
these rules could possibly impede or facilitate, in a fundamental way,the introduction and
impounding of new information into prices as well as the dissemination of information
through markets. Thus any changes to these market-governing regulations are bound to
have a profound effect on the microstructure of markets and on the amount of information
that is available to the participants. Clearly this suggests an important line of research
that focuses on how regulatory changes affect the functioning of markets and whether
regulations actually achieve their purpose. Information flow is also a function of the way
it is processed: the communication systems and physical distances that separate markets.
Therefore, technological advances will also affect the impounding and dissemination of
2
information.
An important yet less explored line of inquiry is how regulations affect the interactions of
various markets and how such effects are manifested in price discovery. Here, I focus on
this question by examining the impact of two major regulatory changes of recent years:
Regulation Fair Disclosure and the decimalization of tick-size.
1.2 Motivation
From the preceding discussion it is evident that information production and dissemination
are critical to efficient functioning of capital markets. Despite the apparent maturity of
financial markets, there are persistent market imperfections such as information asymmetry
and agency conflict. These problems reflect the enduring debate between those who
endorse the view that markets are self-governing and others who insist that some form
of regulatory intervention is necessary. The events of the last decade have significantly
strengthened argument for substantive regulatory reform. Besides this, research has
established that regulation enhances the quality and credibility of information.
Remedial actions that follow financial crises usually envisage some form of new regulation.
Research has endeavored to identify the market imperfections that may justify the
imposition of regulations. In the first instance, is there a significant imperfection or
externality that needs resolution through regulation? How critical is regulation for the
development of equitable capital markets, or do we even need regulation (as one school
would argue)? If we decide that regulation is necessary, do we adopt a minimalist
approach, or impose regulations to pre-empt every imaginable crisis? Indiscriminate
imposition of regulations, far from achieving the desired results, could further exacerbate
the crisis. The regulations themselves may introduce imperfections. Several economic and
systemic factors determine whether regulation is successful in mitigating some of these
imperfections. It is therefore imperative that the effect of the regulations be studied. The
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results may not be conclusive; however such efforts would throw some light on the issue
of whether existing regulation increases efficiency and what changes need to be instituted.
There is a great deal left unanswered on the effectiveness of regulation. This research uses
recent regulatory changes to at least partially answer some of these questions.
Two major regulatory measures that have recently affected information acquisition and
generation are Decimalization of the Tick-Size and Fair Disclosure. The effect of
decimalization on the spread, and its components, liquidity, volatility, transaction costs,
etc., has been well documented. However, the issue of how it affects information flow
and contributions to price discovery has not been adequately investigated. Decimalization
provides greater incentive for information production. Smaller tick-sizes decrease the
lower bounds of the bid-ask spread. The larger the spread the higher the probability
that it straddles the efficient price and the lesser the incentive for information production.
Narrow spreads increase the chance of the efficient price being outside the spread and
provide opportunities for profit, thus motivating information production. Therefore, there
is a greater incentive to uncover information with narrower spreads. This means that not
only members of the larger markets but those who operate in the satellite markets will also
contribute information, thus increasing the information share of the other venues.
The Fair Disclosure regulation states that any release of information by firms must be made
simultaneously to all participants. Historically, firms informed a preferred group of analysts
and institutional investors before informing the general public. These privileged groups
could trade on this information before the rest of the public knew. It is almost tantamount to
trading on insider information. Regulation FD has been specifically designed to eliminate
this advantage. The SEC states that (See Appendix C):
Where this has happened, those who were privy to the information beforehand
were able to make a profit or avoid a loss at the expense of those kept in the
dark.... Investors who see a security’s price change dramatically and only later
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are given access to the information responsible for that move rightly question
whether they are on a level playing field with market insiders.... Issuer selective
disclosure bears a close resemblance in this regard to ordinary “tipping” and
insider trading. In both cases, a privileged few gain an informational edge –
and the ability to use that edge to profit – from their superior access to corporate
insiders, rather than from their skill, acumen, or diligence.
The advance information that such groups possess will translate into a higher information
share for their preferred market. If Reg FD has achieved its purpose, we should see a greater
parity in the information contributions across markets. An analysis of the effects of such
regulations would reveal whether they work and could perhaps have policy implications.
The motivation for this paper is to provide an answer to some of these questions and perhaps
to address some of the gaps in existing literature pertaining to these issues.
5
CHAPTER 2
Literature Review
Before embarking on any study, it is necessary to review the existing research to obtain
an overview of the prevailing ideas. This not only provides a background for this study
but also places it in perspective. The review discusses the important developments that are
relevant to this research and attempts to trace the evolution of the field of microstructure.
Seminal articles that evaluate the role of information in microstructure, the dynamics of
spread components, tick-size effects, and cointegration theory are discussed in detail.
2.1 Information and Microstructure
The Walrasian auction framework that is implied in most financial models does not address
microstructure issues. Asset prices are assumed to reach equilibrium, but the path towards
equilibrium, or the question of how disequilibrium is corrected, is not considered. Classical
economic theory views the market as a trading space that is unrestricted. The trading
opportunities are at once unlimited and costless. These assumptions would naturally
convert prices into martingale processes. In such settings, the random walk would be an
important and economically meaningful characterization of securities prices, particularly
if any random shocks are short-lived and their effect on prices is ephemeral. But the
practical exigencies of trading require some structure, in the form of restrictions, to be
imposed upon the market. Some rules or agreements governing the exchange process need
to be instituted. Quantities and prices cannot be continuous; neither can markets operate
continuously. Therefore, rules specifying the discreteness of quantities, minimum price
6
changes, and market operating times need to be determined. Besides this, efficient channels
for the communication and dissemination of information need to be created. These will
ensure that markets are informationally efficient and securities prices at all times reflect all
available information. These constitute the rules of the game or the structure of the market,
and will influence the path of price evolution. The study of the exchange process is the field
of market microstructure. An important departure of the microstructure view of trade from
the classical setting is that trading is neither unconstrained nor costless. Under this view of
discontinuous and constrained trading processes, the original random walk characterization
of securities prices may seem inappropriate. But prices are determined to a significant
extent by the participants’ conditional expectations. These expectations change as each
trade introduces new information. The set of changing expectations may be viewed as time
series sequences, which can be characterized as some evolving process such as a random
walk with zero-mean disturbances. Therefore, the observed price, which is a function of the
participants’ expectations, may be modeled as a random walk component, to which a trade
effect is added. The random walk, being a martingale, could be interpreted as the efficient
price in the classical economic sense; however, the difficulty is that it is unobservable.
Central to the classical treatment of market microstructure is the concept of an asset trading
in single homogenous market. The operations of the participants provide an inflow of
information into the market which is impounded into the price of the security. This process
of price discovery is one of the primary purposes of a market. However, this framework of
a single central market is now obsolete or at best a partial description of reality. Trading has
dispersed over several venues, and the theoretical central market is, in reality, fragmented.
Consequently, the process of new information in-flow has several sources. Whereas the
traded price in the single central market could be considered a good proxy for the efficient
price, with fragmented information flow, that is no longer the case. The efficient price is no
longer an observable function of a single market, and the processes of price discovery and
price formation need to be reassessed. The contribution of each of these individual markets
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to the efficient price must be measured. Besides this fragmentation, the rules by which
each of these markets operates have a significant impact on the price discovery process.
Therefore, the regulatory environment has a significant role in the contributions of these
markets. The focus of this paper is to study the dynamics of generation and impounding of
new information into asset prices, and the effects of trading rules and regulations on price
formation, particularly in the context of fragmented markets.
The earliest literature on issues of information and prices can be traced back to the market
efficiency research of Fama (?), Grossman (?), and Grossman and Stiglitz (?). The
informational dynamics of stock prices are influenced by the market microstructure, such
as bid-ask spreads, tick-size, transaction costs, and trading rules of different markets.
The issue of fragmented markets was first addressed by Garbade and Silber (?). They
examine the short-run behavior of the prices of the same or identical assets traded on
different markets, in this case, the NYSE and regional exchanges. They introduce the
dominant-satellite idea where one market provides the bulk of new information while the
others follow. The satellite markets either have a minor contribution or none at all. If
Ek is the unobservable equilibrium price at the time of the Kth transaction price Tk then
Tk = Ek + uk where uk ∼ N(0, σ2) and Ek follows a random walk, i.e., Ek = Ek−1 + pk
and pk ∼ N(0, tkψ2) where tkis the time interval between the Kth and (K-1)th transaction.
Garbade et al designate the NYSE as the benchmark or standard (dominant) market.
The price variances of sequences of prices on the NYSE, for the current period, and
the variances of the immediately preceding period are measured. Next, the current price
variances of similar price sequences on a regional market are measured. If the price
variances (i.e., current) of the regional market and that of the preceding NYSE sequence
are less than the variances of the standard (current NYSE variances), then the regional is a
satellite of NYSE. Garbade and Silber find that the regional markets are satellites but not
pure satellites (i.e., perfectly integrated markets).
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Garbade and Silber (?) did not analyze dealer markets, which differ in operation and
informational dynamics from auction markets. This was addressed by Garbade, Pomerenze
and Silber (?), who empirically examine the information content of prices in dealer markets.
They model the price revision process by a dealer as p0 = E + u0 where E is the efficient
price and u0 ∼ N(0, Kσ2). K is a constant that depends on the confidence the dealer places
on his estimate of the efficient price ( i.e., p0 is an unbiased though noisy, estimator of E).
At this point, the dealer observes prices pn = (p1, p2, . . . , pn)
′ posted by his competitors
where any pi = E + ui for i = 1, 2, . . . , n and ui ∼ N(0, Fσ2). These relations can be
combined into the matrix equation P = IE+U where P = (p0, p1, . . . , pn)
′ , I is a (n+ 1)
identity matrix and U ∼ N(0, σ2Ω). The elements of Ω are Ω11 = K, Ωii = F for i > 1
and Ωij = 0 for i 6= j. They find that dealers do obtain information from the prices of
other dealers, but do not discard their own estimates (namely, the contribution of p0 is not
insignificant). They also find that the average price does not contain all the information.
The question of whether the size of a trade and its direction affect the efficient price was
examined by Glosten and Harris (?). They proposed a model in which the efficient price
innovations arise from trade size and direction:
mt = mt−1 + wt (2.1)
wt = ut + qt(λ0 + λ1Vt) (2.2)
pt = mt + qt(c0 + c1Vt) (2.3)
where mt is the efficient price, wt is the innovation to the efficient price, Vt is the trade
volume, qt (= ± 1) is the direction of trade, λ and c are the information content and cost
terms. Madhavan, Richardson and Roomans (?) use a model where the direction of trades
is an autoregressive process, i.e., qt = ρqt−1 + νt. This is motivated by the idea that Buys
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follow Buys and Sells follow Sells. It models a more persistent dependency than the MA
specification of structural models.
The temporal aspects of inter-market price dynamics were analyzed by Stoll and Whaley
(?). They investigate the issue of incorporating new information into prices between the
spot market and the futures market. They compare the return series of the stock index
and the stock index futures. In perfect markets, both of the series must be perfectly
contemporaneously correlated. However, if information arrives in one market before the
other, then one may lead the other in price discovery. Their methodology consists of
regressing the leads and lags of one set of returns on the other. If the coefficients of the
lags of one are significant, then that market leads the other, since its lags explain some the
changes in the other series.
However, the treatment in all these papers does not use the co-integration concept
explicitly. Though the lead-lag treatment may be used to make broad general statements
about precedence in time of one market or another, such an analysis does not allow for
accurate estimation of how much new information is being contributed by each market.
Cointegration analysis permits the decomposition of covariance structures of price series,
which can then be used to estimate the information contributions of markets. The lead-
lag methodology has come under criticism by investigators such as Hasbrouck. From an
econometric perspective the models are misspecified. The models estimate the parameters
of the price series (of the same asset) from different markets. The misspecification arises
from the underlying assumption, that these estimates will converge to single value. But it
can be demonstrated that the aggregation of error processes associated with each of these
price series does not converge, therefore, the assumption that the parameter estimates will
tend towards a single value is incorrect.
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2.1.1 Spreads, Information Asymmetry and Price Formation
The other sources of information regarding prices are the bid-ask spread and the tick-size.
The components of the bid-ask spread were investigated by Huang and Stoll (?). Among the
earlier papers in this area, Demsetz (?), Amihud and Mendelson (?), and Ho and Stoll (?)
focus on inventory holding costs of market makers, while Copeland and Galai (?), Glosten
and Milgrom (?), and Easley and O’Hara (?) look at adverse selection. ? and others
developed statistical models that look at serial covariance. Therefore, broadly speaking,
these models fall into two categories: direction of trade models (i.e., whether the trade
was a buy or a sell) and covariance models. Both classes of papers decompose the spread
into two components and in general do not distinguish between inventory cost and adverse
selection component. Huang and Stoll (?) compare the execution costs between dealer and
auction markets, specifically between NASDAQ and NYSE. They decompose the spread
into quoted spread, effective spread, and realized spread and model transaction costs as
arising from these components. ? provide an explicit methodology to decompose the
spread as arising from order processing, adverse information, and inventory holding costs.
The information asymmetry component of bid-ask spreads is addressed by Bagehot (?),
where he shows that dealers’ losses to informed traders must be compensated by profits
from uninformed traders. Glosten and Milgrom (?) consider the spread as a purely
informational phenomenon. They model a pure dealer market populated with informed and
pure liquidity traders trading only in market orders. The dealer (specialist) is risk-neutral
and has zero expected profits. Even under these circumstances a spread will arise since
the dealer needs to ensure against losses to informed traders and induce uninformed traders
to participate. The dealer posts bid-ask quotes which he will set and revise according
to publicly available information. If an asset has only a high value (V H) and a low
value (V L) with the same probability, and the proportion of informed traders is p, then
uninformed investors will trade at an average value V = (V H + V L)/2 then the ask price,
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A = V Hp + V (1− p) and the bid price B = V Lp + V (1− p) since informed investors
will only transact if they think the price is either V H or V L. Thus we have a spread which
arises from purely informational phenomena. The adverse selection explanations for the
spread have also been investigated from a theoretical perspective by Kyle (?), Easley and
O’Hara (?), and Admati and Plfleiderer (?).
The preceding literature had not explicitly applied time-series methodologies to microstruc-
ture analysis. Garman (?) was the first to adopt such an approach. He models the
arrival time of market orders as a Poisson process. Markets have deviated from the
assumptions of classical economic theory of call auction markets operating at specific
times. They have become continuous in the sense that they trade asynchronously during
continuous time intervals instead of trading synchronously at discrete predetermined times.
{Ni(t), t ∈ [0,∞]} where Ni(t),∈ [1, 2, 3, . . .] is a Poisson process representing the
accumulation of discrete time intervals at which an order is placed, i.e., an asset is
demanded by an individual i at time t. If Yin(tin) is the demand of individual i in his
n−th period, then Xi(t) =
Ni(t)∑
n=1
Yin(tin) represent his total demand over [0,∞]. The
composite stochastic process Xi(t) has mean-value function λi(t) = E[Xi(t)] . If there
are M individuals in the market, then aggregate demand processes are N(t) =
M∑
i=1
Ni(t)
and X(t) =
M∑
i=1
Ni(t)∑
n=1
Yin(tin). ? develop a model for the unobservable fundamental price in
the absence of transaction costs as follows:
Vt is the unobservable fundamental price determined at time t, just before the posting of
the bid-ask.
Qt is an indicator =

+1 : if trade is buyer initiated (i.e., above spread midpoint)
−1 : if trade is seller initiated (i.e., below midpoint)
0 : if trade is the midpoint
(2.4)
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Mt : is the bid - ask midpoint
Pt : is the observed price of transaction
S : is the constant spread
α : is the percentage of half - spread attributable to adverse selection
et : is the serially uncorrelated shock due to public information
Vt = Vt−1 + αS2Qt−1 + et, the change in the fundamental price ∆Vt, is explained by
the two components αS
2
Qt−1 i.e., the private information in the last trade and the public
information et. Though the fundamental price is unobservable, the midpoint Mt is known.
Mt = Vt+β
S
2
t−1∑
i=1
Qi where β is percentage of half-spread due to inventory costs and
t−1∑
i=1
Qi
is the accumulated inventory from market start to t-1, soQ1 is the opening inventory. Then,
∆Mt = (α + β)
S
2
Qt−1 + et shows that quotes are adjusted to include the information
and the inventory costs of the last trade. Finally, the observed price is given as Pt =
Mt +
S
2
Qt + ηt where the error ηt reflects the deviation of the observed half-spread Pt −
Mt from the constant half - spread fracS2 . The final model that is estimated is ∆Pt =
S
2
(Qt −Qt−1) + λS2Qt−1 + et.
Others that modeled the time series behavior of prices and quotes and direction of trades are
Roll (?), Hasbrouck (?), (?), Madhavan et al. (?). In general the results can be summarized
as follows:
i. If transaction costs are the only cause of the spread, then prices should just tend
to bounce between the bid and ask. Roll (1984) shows that this induces negative
autocorrelation.
ii. If asymmetric information is the sole cause of the spread, then prices would reflect
just information inflow through transactions. Price will fall when a sale occurs at the
bid and will rise when a purchase occurs at the ask. Since these events can occur
randomly, price and quote changes will be completely random.
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iii. If inventory costs are the sole cause of the spread, then the tendency is towards
inventory equilibrium. When a sale occurs, the bid-ask will fall to discourage further
sale and encourage purchase and vice-versa.
2.1.2 Tick-Size & Decimalization Studies
The literature on tick-size effects is quite large, but only the papers that deal with the
informational effects are of importance to this investigation. The arguments concerning
reduction of tick-size center around two positions. One side claims that smaller tick-sizes
would increase competition, cause spreads to fall and result in price improvement. The
other side claims that a smaller tick would make front running easier, causing a reduction
in market depth. They further claim that dealers will be unwilling to display order size
and will change to a market order strategy. The overall effect is to render markets less
transparent. Harris (1991) shows that liquidity providers in both exchange and dealer
markets prefer a small set of discrete prices, which would obviate the need for elaborate
and costly negotiation, thus reducing costs. Another behavioral aspect uncovered by him
is that they prefer round fractions such as halves, quarters, etc. Often they may choose
a coarser grid of prices than is required by the exchange. The net effect is that prices
tend to cluster around round numbers and fractions. Harris (1994) shows that as tick-size
decreases, spreads fall and volume goes up. Ahn, Cao and Choe (?) examine the liquidity
changes around the AMEX change from 1/8 to 1/16 in 1992. They found that spreads
declined but volume did not go up much. Porter and Weaver (?) study the effect around the
TSE (Toronto Stock Exchange) changing tick-size from C$0.125 to 0.05 for stocks above
$ 5.00 and from C$0.05 to 0.01 for stocks below $5. Consistent with ?, low-price and high
volume stocks were most affected. Besides this, there is some evidence that prices are less
sticky with smaller tick-size.
Harris (?) reviews arguments for and against decimalization. One view that emerges is
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that tick-size effect may vary by the amount of information that an exchange releases.
Bessembinder (?) finds that as stocks go up or down through a threshold over which the
tick changes, a smaller tick-size causes moderately lower transaction costs and slightly
lower volatility. Price improvements must take place at the minimum tick level rather than
in response to what new information dictates.
Bacidore (?) explicitly addresses the informational impact of decimalization. Reduction
in transaction costs with smaller tick-size has been well documented. This has been
interpreted as dealers enjoying higher profits due to larger spreads imposed by bigger
tick-size. Bacidore argues that this implies that all other components of the spread are
unchanged. But if other components changed, then narrower spreads may be attributed to
such components. Bacidore (?) and Bessembinder (?) show that a part of the fall in the
spread is due to reduction in the adverse selection component. However, Bacidore shows
that traders are more willing to become informed as tick-size increases. In his model, the
adverse selection component is proportional to the fixed cost component of the spread, but
his arguments are not counter to the idea that a smaller spread generates more research.
It could also be argued that wider spreads are more likely to straddle the true price and
therefore there is less incentive to obtain information.
2.2 Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD)1
No matter how efficient markets are, it is assumed that insiders have superior information.
Evidence suggests that investors view voluntary disclosures by management as credible
information. Capital market research has established that information disclosure decisions
affect almost all market transactions. Every sphere of capital market activity, such as
valuation of corporate assets, corporate control, proprietary and capital costs, is dependent
on the quantity of information available to market participants. As such, there is a demand
1Documentation on Regulation FD is in Appendix A
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for information. Management, for a variety of reasons, is sometimes reluctant or tardy
in disclosing private information. Such asymmetric information problems can impede the
efficient allocation of capital in a capital market economy. One solution to this problem is
intermediaries such as financial analysts who engage in uncovering the private information
of managers. Another is to institute regulation that forces managers to fully divulge private
information. Historically managers have developed close relationships with groups of
analysts. Some of the favored analysts were informed before the information was made
public. This seemingly unfair timing advantage that analysts enjoyed gave rise to a general
criticism that markets were not level playing fields. Another closely related issue is the
quality of the information disclosed.
In an effort to neutralize the informational advantage of analysts or other favored entities,
the SEC promulgated Regulation Fair Disclosure in August 2000. It came into force on
23rd October of the same year. The regulation requires that all disclosures of information
be made available to everyone simultaneously, and it prohibits the earlier practice of
corporations selectively informing favored analysts and professional investors. The effect
of this regulation would be to level the playing field, and there would be greater parity in
the levels of information available to investors.
2.2.1 Studies on Financial Intermediaries
Studies on the informational role of intermediaries have mostly focused on financial
analysts. Financial analysts are engaged in evaluating information collected from both
public and private sources in order to eventually make a recommendation. The results
show that overall, analysts do add value to capital markets and play an important role in
improving market efficiency. Barth and Hutton (?) show that the stock prices of firms with
a larger analyst following incorporate new information significantly faster than the prices
of less widely followed firms. It is expected that the accuracy of forecasts is predicated
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upon characteristics of analysts such as innate ability, experience, and familiarity with a
particular sector or industry. Jacobs et al. (?) show that innate ability plays a significant
role while Gilson et al. (?) find that industry specialization leads to more accurate forecasts.
As mentioned earlier, the associations developed with managers and the brokerage-firm
affiliations of analysts can introduce systemic biases. ? state that analysts are overly
enthusiastic and their forecasts are dominated by “buy” recommendations. Furtheremore,
since analyst compensation is related to the trading volume and investment banking fees
generated by them for their brokerage firms, Lin and McNichols (?) and Dechow et al.
(?) show that their forecasts tend to favor firms that have a business association with the
analysts’ employer. The effect of voluntary disclosure regulation on analysts is not clear.
There could be two opposing effects. That is, the additional disclosure can increase the
supply of information to the analysts and improve their forecast accuracy. This would
result in a demand for analysts’ services. On the other hand, the increased availability of
information may render the analyst superfluous and reduce demand for his services. Lang
and Lundholm (?) show that firms that release more information have a larger analyst
following. The forecast accuracy for these firms is higher with less volatility in revisions.
2.2.2 Regulation FD, Information Asymmetry and Volatility
Eleswarapu et al. (?) show that after Regulation FD the adverse selection costs had
fallen significantly thus leading to the conclusion that the regulation reduced information
asymmetry. Opponents of FD have argued that firms will decrease the information supplied
to the market, causing more noise in trading or larger pricing errors. Opponents also
argue that instead of a continuous dissemination of information through analysts, firms will
choose less frequent announcements, and information flow will be lumpier, causing large
price swings. The net result would be an increase in return volatility. Heflin, Subramanyam
and Zhang (?) investigate the return volatility pre- and post-FD. Though they find an
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increase in volatility, it seems that it is not attributable to FD. They find return distributions
have less kurtosis post-FD and lesser extreme returns. The abnormal return volatility is, in
fact, lesser.
2.2.3 Information Flow and Analyst Forecast Accuracy Post-FD
Zitzewitz (?) finds that the total information flow has not decreased post-FD. He finds that
the share of new information that is private has fallen subsequent to the implementation of
FD. The forecast accuracy of analysts has declined and forecast dispersion has increased.
Mohanram and Sunder (?) also find that analysts’ forecast accuracy has fallen post-
FD. Analysts that had ties with firms had superior forecast accuracy pre-FD but could
not maintain this quality after FD. Analysts seem to be reducing their coverage of well-
followed firms and focusing their efforts on firms that had not been followed closely
pre-FD. After the imposition of FD, there seems to be a trend towards idiosyncratic
information discovery. Since one of the aims of Regulation FD is to reduce information
asymmetry, Sidhu et al. (?) examine the effect of Regulation FD on adverse selection
costs. They estimate the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread and find
contrary to Eleswarapu, Thompson and Venkataraman (?), that adverse selection costs
have increased and conclude that Regulation FD has failed to achieve its goal. There is
conflicting evidence, and perhaps additional investigation is necessary to establish whether
FD has really increased informational parity.
2.3 Information Share of Markets
2.3.1 Measures of Information Share
The two information share measures that are used in this paper were developed by
Hasbrouck (?) and Gonzalo and Granger (?). Hasbrouck (?) constructed a metric for
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measuring the information share of a market when a single asset is traded in several
markets. When there are several price series of the same asset, they can be viewed as
an unobservable efficient price plus innovations introduced into each venue where the asset
is traded. The Hasbrouck method consists essentially of decomposing the variance and
allocating portions of it to the various markets. A precursor to this idea was first introduced
by Garbade and Silber (?) and Garbade et al. (?). The Gonzalo-Granger approach, instead
of apportioning the variance of the innovations, decomposes the innovations themselves
into permanent and stationary or transient effects, where the permanent effect is a measure
of the new information incorporated into the price series. Booth et al. (?), Chu et al. (?),
and Harris et al. (?) use this permanent-stationary decomposition.
2.3.2 Variance Decomposition (HASBROUCK) Measure
Hasbrouck uses the co-integration approach and decomposes the variance of the innova-
tions to the vector of price variables. The Granger Representation Theorem can be used to
represent a price vector as a finite Vector Error Correction Model (VECM). The covariance
matrix of the VECM is decomposed into the permanent and transient shocks to the
unobserved efficient price. If Pt = (p1, p2, . . . , pk)
′ is vector of k price series, then a vector
moving average (VMA) representation of this system is ∆Pt = Ψ(L)et where Ψ(L) is a
polynomial of lags. By backward substitution, we obtain Pt = P0 + Ψ(1)
t∑
i=1
ei + Ψ
∗(L)et.
Ψ(1) is the matrix polynomial which contains the co-integrating relationships, and Ψ∗(L)
is such that Ψ(L)et = Ψ(1) + (1 − L)Ψ∗(L). The information share of the ith market
=
ψ2i Ωii
ψΩψ′ where ψi is the row vector of Ψ(1) and Ω is the variance-covariance matrix. If the
error terms are not correlated, then Ω is diagonal, but if they are correlated, then some of
the off-diagonal elements will be non-zero and some restrictions need to be applied. The
usual method is to use a Cholesky Decomposition where Ω = FF ′ . Now the information
share is ([ψF ])
2
ψΩψ′ . Hasbrouck finds that the NYSE contributes 92% of the innovations to the
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efficient price. Huang (2002) uses this measure to examine the quality of ECN quotes and
finds that they do contribute new information to the efficient price. Chakraborthy et al. (?)
also adopt this measure to investigate whether the derivatives market leads the spot market
in new information.
2.3.3 Permanent-Transient (GONZALO-GRANGER) Measure
? use the permanent-stationary decomposition of the VECM to examine the price discovery
in the German market, i.e., between the stock index, index futures, and index options.
Chu et al. (?) use the same methodology to investigate price discovery between the S&P
500 index, the index futures, and the S&P Depository Receipts market. Harris et al.
(?) examine the synchronous price series of IBM stock on several exchanges. All of
these borrow the methodology of Gonzalo and Granger (G&G) (?) in the investigation
of long memory processes. The G&G method partitions the cointegrated system vector
into a permanent component and a transitory component. Let Xt = (x1, x2, . . . , xn)
′
be a vector of cointegrated variables. Then it can be represented as Xt = C1ft + C2zt
where the permanent and transient components are ft, zt respectively, and C1, C2 are
loading matrices. We can show that C1 = β⊥(α
′
⊥β⊥)
−1. Whereas the Hasbrouck measure
focuses on partitioning the error variance, the G&G measure focuses on partitioning the
co-integrated system. Yan and Zivot (?) compare both measures with simulated data and
show that one is a scaled version of the other.
2.4 Time Series Theory
2.4.1 Cointegration
Analysis of cointegrated systems and the error-correction representation in particular were
formally addressed by the seminal paper of Engle and Granger (?). But the concept
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of cointegration was first introduced by Granger (?). Mean-reverting or error-correcting
behavior of variables was investigated by Phillips (?) and Sargan (?). Engle and Granger
(?) show that if a set of integrated variables is cointegrated, meaning that it has a stationary
linear combination, then the system has an error-correction representation. The VECM
consists of an error-correction vector and a finite number of lagged variables. If Xt is a
(Nx1) vector of time series that is cointegrated, denoted by CI(d, b) where d = b = 1,
then some linear combination β ′Xt is stationary. It represents the long-run equilibrium
relationship, which can be expressed as β ′Xt = 0 where β is the cointegrating vector.
However, there could be more than one cointegrating relationship, and β is often a matrix
with the columns as cointegrating vectors. In practice, β ′Xt is rarely in equilibrium, and
β
′
Xt = zt where zt is the stationary deviation from equilibrium or zt ∼ iid(0, σ2).
2.4.2 Common Trends and Identification Restrictions
The concept of a shared or common trend (the unobservable efficient price is the common
stochastic trend) of cointegrated variables was addressed by Stock and Watson (?). They
provide a methodology to test for the number of common trends, i.e., the order of
integration. Sims (?) addresses questions of identification in large systems and offers
methods of recovery of structural parameters that do not need “incredible identification
restrictions.”. Besides these there are several excellent textbook-level treatments of
cointegration such as Hamilton (Time Series Analysis) or Enders (Applied Econometric
Time Series). The textbooks that focus exclusively on cointegration are Lu¨tkepohl (New
Introduction to Multiple Time Series analysis), Johansen (Likelihood-Based Inference in
Cointegrated Vector Auto-Regressive Models) and Anindya Banerjee et al. (Cointegration,
Error-Correction and the Econometric Analysis of Non-Stationary Data). Lastly, Long-
Run Economic Relationships, Readings in Cointegration, edited by Engle and Granger.
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CHAPTER 3
Cointegration Analysis
3.1 Review of Cointegration
This study involves the analysis of the evolution of asset prices or price series in different
markets. Each variable represents a time series of prices from a single market of the
same asset observed over time. Therefore, we have a set of variables, each a time series
representing various markets. The series are non-stationary and seemingly independent.
But, they represent the price of the same asset; therefore, they are bound by arbitrage
and cannot wander too far away from each other. If the price in any market wanders
too far from the others, arbitrage operations force that price back into the neighborhood
of the other prices. Thus arbitrage forces the prices to remain in dynamic equilibrium.
This equilibrium hypothesis therefore predicates the existence of some linear combinations
of the price vectors that would be stationary. This is a classic instance of cointegration.
Consequently, a brief review of the analysis and econometrics of cointegrated variables
would helpful in the subsequent model development and methodology.
3.1.1 Cointegration and Error Correction
A collection of random variables composed of the values of {Xt} is a time-series. {Xt}1
= (X1, X2, . . . , Xt)
′
is considered weakly or covariance stationary if it has a constant
1denotes the whole time-series whereas Xt or xt denotes the value at time t. Therefore {Xt} can be
considered a collection of random variables.
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mean, finite variance, and the covariance is a function of the difference in time periods
that separate different observations. If the mean has a trend, or the variance of the series
does not converge to a finite value, then the series is non-stationary. A series can be non-
stationary when it contains unit roots and is said to be integrated. The order of integration
‘d’ denotes that the series, described as I(d), can be made stationary by differencing d
times.
A set of such non-stationary variables or time series is said to be cointegrated when some
linear combination(s) of them is stationary. Assume a set of non stationary variables, each
of which is I(d). We have {Xt} = (x1t, x2t, x3t, . . . , xkt) or a vector of k non-stationary
variables, each of which is integrated of order d. They are cointegrated if some linear
combination(s) of them is integrated of order I(d − b) where b ≤ d. That is, if β =
(β0, β1, . . . , βk)
′ is some vector of constants, and if β ′Xt is integrated of order I(d − b),
then {Xt} is cointegrated i.e., CI(d, b). If {Xt} is I(1), then β ′Xt is stationary or I(0).
Let Yt = β0 + β1x1t + β2x2t + . . .+ βkxkt + et where et is a stationary process.
Then et = Yt − (β0 + β1x1t + β2x2t + . . .+ βkxkt).
Therefore Yt − (β0 + β1x1t + β2x2t + . . . + βkxkt) is stationary, since et is stationary by
definition.
Let [Yt, x1t, x2t, . . . , xkt)]
′
= Xt then β
′
Xt = et.
Since et is stationary β
′
Xt is also stationary and β is a cointegrating vector (CI). Since
β is a linear combination then any scalar multiple λ β is also a cointegrating vector for
λ 6= 0. Consequently, the cointegrating vector is not unique. The cointegrating vector is
usually normalized by one of the parameters, e.g., β ′ =
(
1,−β1
β0
,−β2
β0
, . . . ,−βn
β0
)
which
is normalized by β0. The long-run equilibrium relationship is represented by Yt − (β0 +
β1x1t + β2x2t + . . . + βkxkt) = 0 and et is the deviation from equilibrium or equilibrium
error.
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In a multivariate framework, there could be several stationary combinations of the variables
and therefore several linearly independent cointegrating vectors. If a vector Xt has k
integrated components then there will be a maximum of (k−1) cointegrating vectors (CIs).
The number of such linearly independent cointegrating vectors is the cointegrating rank of
Xt, therefore the cointegrating rank ≤ (k − 1). In the above analysis where β was deemed
to be a vector, we are implicitly assuming a unique cointegrating vector, but there could
be several CIs, and β is usually a (kxr) matrix of rank r, whose columns are cointegrating
vectors.
3.2 Granger Representation Theorem2
The theorem states that any set of cointegrated I(1) variables has an error correction
representation. If the components of a vector of variables Xt are cointegrated, then they
tend towards a long-run equilibrium or have a stationary difference which is a stationary
linear combination. For simplicity, ifXt is bivariate i.e., Xt = (yt, zt)
′ , and its components
are cointegrated, then yt−1 and zt−1 could deviate from the equilibrium due to shocks eyt−1
and ezt−1. These deviations are corrected in the next period; therefore, the process can be
represented as
l∆yt = αy(yt−1 − γzt−1) + eyt (3.1)
∆zt = αz(yt−1 − γzt−1) + ezt
where αy and αz are speed-of-adjustment coefficients, and (yt−1 − γzt−1) is the error
correction term. Then Xt = (yt, zt)
′ in difference form can be represented as ∆Xt =
αβ
′
Xt−1 + et where α = (αy, αz)
′ and β = (1,−γ). Since the system can now be
represented as a VAR, Box-Jenkins methods could be used to include lags to arrive at a
properly specified form. Formally, if a set of k time series variables are integrated of order
2A formal proof of the Granger Representation Theorem is provided in Appendix B
24
1 and they are cointegrated, the Granger Representation Theorem states that they have the
following error correction representation
∆Xt = ΓXt−1 +
p∑
i=1
Γi∆Xt−1 + et (3.2)
where Γi = (kxk) coefficient matrix with elements Γjk(i), Γ = αβ
′
= matrix with at least
one element 6= 0, et = k -dimensional vector of disturbances.
Usually, since rk(α) = rk(β) = somer < k, rk(Γ) = r. Since ∆Xt,
p∑
i=1
Γi∆Xt−1 and et
are all stationary, ΓXt−1, which is the only expression that includes I(1) variables, must
also be stationary. Therefore, ΓXt−1 contains the cointegration relations (Note: we can
also have a vector of intercept terms, but since it is not necessary for the current analysis,
it has been omitted).
3.2.1 Vector Error Correction Model (VECM)
The VECM is a very important way of decomposing a cointegrated system of I(1) variables
into stationary and non-stationary components. The model can be briefly described as
follows: Let Xt = (X1t, X2t, . . . , Xkt)
′ be a vector of k, I(1) variables with t =
1, 2, . . . , T . If Xt is a first order vector autoregressive process, then Xt = Xt−1 + et
where et is a white-noise vector et = (ε1t, ε2t, . . . , εkt)
′ , then ∆Xt = et (Note: Xt could
have a drift term, but for the analysis it is not essential since it will be shown later that
any deterministic trend can be purged). By the Wold Decomposition Theorem, ∆Xt has
an infinite vector moving average (VMA) representation Xt = C(L)et that is ∆Xt =
c0et + c1et−1 + c2et−2, . . . ,∞ = C(L)et where C(L) = c0 + c1L + c2L2 + c3L3, . . . ,∞
and L is the lag operator and cj is a (kxk) diagonal coefficient matrix:
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c0 =

c10 0 . . . 0
0 c20 . . . 0
. . .
0 0 . . . ck0

c1 =

c11 0 . . . 0
0 c21 . . . 0
. . .
0 0 . . . ck1

cj =

c1j 0 . . . 0
0 c2j . . . 0
. . .
0 0 . . . ckj

The matrix polynomial C(L) can be written as C(L) = C(1) + (1 − L)C∗(L), C(L) =
C(1) + [C(L) − C(1)]. The function [C(L) − C(1)] has a solution for the associated
homogeneous form [C(L)−C(1)] = 0 at L = 1; therefore (1−L) is a factor and [C(L)−
C(1)] can be expressed as (1 − L)C∗(L) where C∗(L) is another polynomial in L. From
this we have:
∆Xt = C(L)et = C(1)et + (1− L)C∗(L)et or Xt = Xt−1 + C(1)et + (1− L)C∗(L)et.
By applying regularity conditions to ci, (1 − L)C∗(L)et can be made stationary. The
difference equation Xt = Xt−1 + C(1)et + (1 − L)C∗(L)et can be solved by backward
substitution to yield Xt = X0 +C(1)
t∑
i=1
ei + (1−L)C∗(L)et. If Xt contained a drift term,
i.e., Xt = a0 +Xt−1 + et, then a deterministic drift term a0t would appear in the solution:
Xt = a0t+X0 +C(1)
t∑
i=1
ei + (1−L)C∗(L)et. X0 can be set to zero and the deterministic
trend can be deducted out; this is the reason why the drift term was excluded earlier. The
term C(1)
t∑
i=1
ei will contain the non-stationary elements that are the stochastic trends that
cause permanent effects on Xt, and (1− L)C∗(L)et will contain the transient effects. It is
the permanent component that is analyzed to obtain the impulse response functions (IRF)
and their half-life. However, the transient term may provide insights into the dynamics
of the cointegrated system even if the shocks are devoid of information. Recall that by the
Granger Theorem the vector seriesXt has the form ∆Xt = ΓXt−1+
p∑
i=1
Γi∆Xt−1+et where
Γ = αβ
′; therefore ∆Xt = αβ
′
Xt−1 + Γ1∆Xt−1 + Γ2∆Xt−2 + . . .+ Γp−1∆Xt−p+1 + et.
C(z) = (1− z)Ik−αβ ′z−
p∑
i=1
Γi(1− z)zi is the characteristic polynomial whose roots lie
on or outside the unit circle since ∆Xt is stationary. Therefore, det |C(z)| = 0 for z ≥ 1.
Also, since the ranks of α and β are equal, i.e., rk(α) = rk(β) = r < k, rk(αβ ′) = r, the
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number of unit roots i.e., z = 1 is exactly k − r. The vector moving average form is
Xt = X0 + Γ
t∑
i=1
ei + Γ
∗(L)et (3.3)
Johansen (?) shows
Γ = β⊥
α⊥
Ik − p−1∑
i=1
Γi
 β⊥
−1 α′⊥ (3.4)
Γ∗(L)et =
∞∑
j=0
Γ∗jet−j
3.2.2 Hasbrouck Measure
Let Pt be a (kx1) vector of log prices of one asset traded in k markets. Since the prices are
random walks, they contain a unit root and are I(1) variables. But since we assume that
they are cointegrated, some linear combination will be stationary. That is, Pt = Pt−1 + et
and ∆Pt is stationary. Pt = (p1, p2, . . . , pk)
′ and et = (e1t, e2t, . . . , ekt)
′ is a disturbance
vector with E(et) = 0,
E(ei, e
′
j) =

Σ : i = j
0 : otherwise;
(3.5)
that is, the errors are uncorrelated. By the previous discussion of cointegrated systems,
∆Pt has an infinite VMA representation from a Wold decomposition:
∆Pt = et + θ1et−1 + θ2et−2 + . . .+ θnet−n + . . .+∞ = Θ(L)et (3.6)
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By the Granger Representation Theorem, this can be written as a VECM (Vector Error
Correction Model) of some finite order k − 1
∆Pt = α[β
′
Pt−1 − E(β ′Pt−1] +
k−1∑
i=1
Γi∆Pt−i + et (3.7)
where α is the vector of error correction coefficients, and β is the cointegrating vector. The
expression [β ′Pt−1−E(β ′Pt−1)] is the deviation in the previous period from the equilibrium
value. Since ∆Pt = et + θ1et−1 + θ2et−2 + . . .+ θnet−n + . . .+∞ = Θ(L)et, we can solve
for Pt by backward iterative substitution as shown earlier to obtain
Pt = P0 + Θ(1)
t∑
i=1
ei + Θ
∗(L)et (3.8)
From the factorization of Θ(L)et = Θ(1) + (1 − L)Θ∗(L), Θ(1) will contain the
cointegrating relationships, i.e., it has the I(1) components. However, since ∆Pt is
stationary, these integrated components must be purged. This is achieved by multiplying it
with the cointegrating vector β, such that β ′Θ(1) = 0.
For simplicity, if Pt is bivariate, i.e., Pt = (p1t, p2t)
′ , then ∆Pt is their difference;
consequently, we have a known cointegrating vector β = (1,−1)′ , and, as Hasbrouck
shows, the rows of Θ(1) would be identical. If this common row vector θ = (θ1, θ2)
′ , then
the stochastic trend is θ′et = θ1e1t + θ2e2t. Therefore, Pt = P0 + Θ(1)
t∑
i=1
ei + Θ
∗(L)et can
be written as
Pt = P0 +
 1
1
xt + Θ∗(L)et (3.9)
or xt = xt−1 + (θ1e1t + θ2e2t) where xt is the unobserved efficient (full information) price
and (θ1e1t + θ2e2t) is the information in-flow. The efficient price path is a random walk.
The information share of each market is the share of the variance of (θ1e1t + θ2e2t). As
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defined earlier, E(eie
′
j) = Σ = θΣθ
′ . Therefore, the information share of the ith market is
ISi =
θ1i σ
2
i
θΣθ′
=
θ1i σ
2
i
θ11σ
2
1 + θ
1
2σ
2
2
, for i = 1, 2 (3.10)
We had assumed Eq. 3.5; this means that Σ is a diagonal matrix. However, if the error terms
are correlated, then we will have non-zero, off-diagonal elements, and restrictions need
to be applied to recover the structural coefficients. The preferred method is a Cholesky
Decomposition of the covariance matrix Σ. Let Σ = UU ′ where U is a lower triangle
matrix. Then ISi =
([θ
′
U ]i)
2
θΣθ′ where [θ
′
U ]i is the ith element of θ
′
U . In general, if
we have k prices, then Pt is k-variate (Pt = p1t, p2t, . . . , pkt)
′ . As stated earlier the
cointegrating vectors and the Cholesky Decomposition are not unique. In particular the
Cholesky Decomposition depends on the order in which the variables enter the price vector.
Therefore, all possible permutations must be examined in the estimation of information
shares.
3.2.3 Component Share
Gonzalo and Granger proposed another method of decomposing a vector of cointegrated
variables into permanent and stationary components. They call it a P-T (Permanent-
Transitory) decomposition. This method has been implemented by researchers such as
Booth (?), Harris (?) and others, to develop an alternative measurement of a market’s
contribution to the efficient price. Gonzalo and Granger show that a cointegrated system
can be decomposed into a permanent or integrated component P and a stationary (transient)
component T, and that the permanent component is a linear combination of the variables in
Xt.
Let Xt = (x1t, x2t, . . . , xkt)
′ be a vector of I(1) variables that are cointegrated. Then there
exists a (kxr) matrix β where r ≤ k and rk(β) = r such that β ′Xt is I(0). The error
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correction representation is as follows:
∆Xt = γβ
′Xt−1 +
∞∑
i=1
Γi∆Xt−i + et (3.11)
The vector Xt can be decomposed into (k-r) I(1) components; and k stationary components
therefore
Xt = A1ft + X˜t (3.12)
where A1 is defined such that β
′
A1 = 0, i.e., it is a null space of β
′ . ft consists of the I(1)
common trends as defined in Stock and Watson (?) and is a linear combination of Xt. Let
ft = B1Xt (3.13)
substituting in Eq. 3.12 X˜t = (I − A1B1)Xt = A2β ′Xt = A2zt where zt = β ′Xt. From
Eq. 3.11, the only linear combinations of Xt which are not affected by X˜t are
ft = γ
′
⊥Xt. Therefore, Xt = A1ft + A2zt. The non-stationary part is A1ft. Since Zt
is stationary, it has no long-run effect on A1ft, i.e., Zt does not Granger-cause A1ft.
Gonzalo and Granger define the components as follows: α is the vector of adjustment
coefficients, β is the cointegrating matrix Yt = γ
′
Xt where γ = (α
′
⊥β⊥)
−1α
′
⊥ where α⊥
and β⊥ are orthogonal complements of α and β. If, as in the previous case, β = (1,−1)′
then, β⊥ = (1, 1)
′
= 1 (note that 1 is a 2x1 vector of ones). Then γ = (α′⊥1)
−1α
′
⊥ and
the permanent component = γ′Xt = [(α
′
⊥1)
−1α
′
⊥]
′
Xt, which is a weighted average of the
vector Xt. The weights are γi =
α⊥,i
α⊥,1+α⊥,2
for i = 1, 2. This is the component share.
Therefore, the component share CSi = α⊥iα⊥,1+α⊥,2 .
3.2.4 Comparison of the Information Measures
Though both measures are derived from the VECM, they differ in their definitions of
innovations to the implicit stochastic trend. Both measures decompose the impact of
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shocks and allocate it to different markets. The Hasbrouck measure defines information
contributions in terms of the contributions to the variance of the stochastic trend. That is, it
decomposes the variance of the permanent component and allocates parts of this variance
(ψΩψ ) to each market. In contrast, the Gonzalo-Granger measure focuses exclusively on
the error correction process. It measures only contributions to the permanent component
and ignores the transitory effects. It decomposes the permanent component as a linear
combination of the prices from each market with the weights being the shares of the
respective markets. Though the approaches are different, De Jong (?) shows that both
these measures are closely related.
Pt = P0 + Θ(1)
t∑
i=1
ei + Θ
∗(L)et (3.14)
We know that β ′Θ(1) = 0 and Θ(1)α = 0 and Θ(1) = β⊥
[
α⊥
(
Ik −
p−1∑
i=1
Γi
)
β⊥
]−1
α
′
⊥.
The permanent innovation is (θ1e1t + θ2e2t) =α
′
et. Therefore, α
′
= θ = (θ1, θ2)
′ since
a unit change in the permanent innovation has a one unit impact on the price vector,
i.e., β⊥
[
α⊥
(
Ik −
p−1∑
i=1
Γi
)
β⊥
]−1
= 1. Therefore, CS and IS are similar, up to a scalar
multiplier in this case.
The Gonzalo-Granger representation, i.e., Xt = A1ft + X˜t is a broader decomposition.
The crucial difference between the two decompositions, is that though ft is a covariance
stationary component, it is not necessarily a random walk. Therefore, it cannot be said to
be an unbiased expectation of Xt and its variance will not converge to that of Xt. Thus,
the utility of this type of decomposition to microstructure studies is limited. Unless the
underlying structural model is so defined that would justify such a generalization, a non-
martingale component, though covariance stationary, is very limited in its application.
An empirical test of both measures was conducted in Hasbrouck (?) where the structural
model is known. A comparative study was made of how well each procedure recovers the
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structural parameters of a known data-generating process. A two-market Roll Model was
used for the study.
Case I: The efficient price innovations are due to non-trade public information
There are two markets i = 1,2 that are structurally identical, and the efficient price evolves
as mt = mt−1 + ut qit = ±1 with probability of 0.5. It is the bid-ask or buy-sell indicator
pit = mt + cqit for i = 1, 2, . . . where c is the half-spread ut, q1t and q2t are uncorrelated.
Two price series p1t and p2t are generated with c = 1 and σu = 1. The series are
cointegrated by construction, and the estimates of the two measures are given in Table
3.1.
Table 3.1: Markets with Public Information
Market 1 Variance of Efficient First Order Autocorrelation
Price Discovery Price Changes of Efficient Price Changes
Structural Model 50 1 0
G&G Estimate 50 2 -0.25
IS Estimate 21-79 1.01 0
As the two markets are identical with neither market leading, their information contribu-
tions must be equal i.e., 50%, each. The G&G method correctly estimates the share, as
50%, while the Hasbrouck method estimates a fairly wide interval, but it contains the true
value. Though the G&G measure was superior, it estimates the statistical properties of the
common price, i.e., f1 = 0.5p1t+0.5p2t, incorrectly as variance = 2 and covariance = -0.25,
whereas they should be 1 and 0, respectively. The Hasbrouck measure accurately estimates
both these parameters. Therefore, the G&G method will overestimate the volatility and
autocorrelation.
Case II: Markets with private information
mt = mt−1 + λq1t pit = mt + c1q1t and p2t = mt−1 + c2q2t where λ is the liquidity
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parameter. The second market lags the first by one period. The values of the two half-
spreads and the liquidity parameters are set to unity for the structural model. The results are
given in Table 3.2. In this case both methods are accurate in their estimate of information
Table 3.2: Markets with Private Information
Market 1 Variance of Efficient First Order Autocorrelation
Price Discovery Price Changes of Efficient Price Changes
Structural Model 100 1 0
G&G Estimate 98 4.79 -0.39
IS Estimate 100 1.01 0
share but the G&G method is once again overestimating the statistical properties. The
Hasbrouck bounds are very close (in fact they coincide,) and it correctly measures the
variance and autocorrelation, the reason being that there is a single source of randomness,
and therefore mt can be accurately recovered from price history. It is to be noted that
though both methods give the same estimate of information contribution, the Hasbrouck
measure’s estimate of the moments of the random walk component are far more accurate
and therefore would be better in forecasting.
Case III: Markets with public and private information
mt = mt−1 + λq1t + ut pit = mt + c1q1t and p2t = mt−1 + c2q2t. Here, too, market 1 is the
information source, with c1 = 1, c2 = 0 and λ = 1. The spread of market 1 is higher than
market 2 since it is where informed trading takes place, and the costs of trading, monitoring
and regulation are higher than in the satellite market. The results are given in Table 3.3. The
Hasbrouck bounds are reasonably close, and its estimation of moments is also accurate.
In contrast, the G&G method yields a gross underestimation of the information share of
market 1, and in fact is far less than the lower bound of the Hasbrouck measure.
As can be seen from the foregoing results, both measures do not accurately recover
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Table 3.3: Markets with Public and Private Information
Market 1 Variance of Efficient First Order Autocorrelation
Price Discovery Price Changes of Efficient Price Changes
Structural Model 100 2 0
G&G Estimate 60 1.98 0
IS Estimate 90-98 2.01 0
the structural information share, but the Hasbrouck measure does contain the structural
parameter, and it accurately estimates the moments of the random walk. The G&G
measure, on the other hand, can in some cases yield very inaccurate estimates and tends to
overestimate volatility and autocorrelations. The G&G measure being a weighted average
of the factor weights, is computationally simpler. Though De Jong had shown that both
measures are proportional, we must note that the changes in the G&G factor and Hasbrouck
implied efficient price are not proportional. The key difference is that the G&G factor
weights are applied to current prices whereas the Hasbrouck weights are applied to the
price innovations.
A further illustration of the relationship between the two measures is demonstrated by
Baillie et al. (?). Whereas Hasbrouck estimates a VMA model, Baillie et al. (?) show the
same results can be obtained from a VECM. As an illustration, take a bivariate VECM
∆Yt = αβ
′
Yt−1 +
k∑
i−1
Aj∆Yt−i + εt where Yt = (y1t, y2t)
′
with covariance matrix: Ω = σ21 ρσ1σ2
ρσ2σ1 σ
2
1
. Hasbrouck converts this to a VMA as ∆Yt = Ψ(L)εt and Ψ(1) =
β⊥Γα
′
⊥ where Γ =
(
α
′
⊥
(
I − k∑
i=1
Ai
)
β⊥
)−1
[in most cases β = (1,−1)′].
Gonzalo and Granger decompose Yt as Yt = ΠYt + Azt and show that α⊥ = (pi1, pi2)
′ .
Therefore, if β = (1,−1)′ then Ψ(1) =
 ψ
ψ
 = Γ
 pi1 pi2
pi1 pi2
 or ψ1ψ2 = pi1pi2 . If
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the errors are not correlated, then Ω is diagonal, and information share Si = ψi
2σi
2
ψΩψ′
=
pi2i σ
2
i
2∑
i=1
pi2i σ
2
i
or pi
2
i σ
2
i
k∑
i=1
pi2i σ
2
i
in a multivariate system. But if Ω is not diagonal, then a Cholesky
Decomposition such that Ω = FF ′ is used, and Si =
([ψF ]i)
2
ψΩψ′ . [ψF ]i is the i
th row of ψF .
If F =
 f11 0
f12 f22
 =
 σ1 0
ρσ2 σ2
√
(1− ρ2)
 then S1S2 = (pi1f11+pi2f12)2(pi2f22)2 . Since we are
considering a bivariate model, S1 + S2 = 1. Therefore,
S1 =
(pi1f11 + pi2f12)
2
(pi1f11 + pi2f12)2(pi2f22)2
(3.15)
S2 =
(pi2f22)
2
(pi1f11 + pi2f12)2(pi2f22)2
Generalizing to a k-variate system:
S1 =
(
k∑
i=1
piifi1
)2
(
k∑
i=1
piifi1
)2
+
(
k∑
i=1
piifi2
)2
+ . . .+ (pikfkk)
2
(3.16)
S2 =
(pikfkk)
2(
k∑
i=1
piifi1
)2
+
(
k∑
i=1
piifi2
)2
+ . . .+ (pikfkk)
2
Since all the variables can be obtained from the estimation of a VECM, the method is
relatively easier.
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CHAPTER 4
Hypothesis Development
4.1 Price Discovery Decimalization and Spreads
There are several strands of literature on the informational effects of decimalization. One
states that decimalization decreases transparency and information. Harris (?) had shown
that limit orders decline as tick-size decreases, reducing liquidity. The prices tend to cluster,
adversely affecting timely incorporation of new information.
Another view is that smaller tick-size makes incorporation of new information easier. The
smallest price change that can occur will be at the minimum tick-size, rather than at levels
commensurate with the quantity of new information. Therefore, if new information is not
sufficient to cause a change equal to or greater than the minimum tick, price changes will
occur only after sufficient information has accumulated. Therefore, smaller tick-size makes
price discovery more efficient and prices will be less sticky.
Another argument is that the asymmetric information component of the spread changes
with the tick. Bacidore (?) and Bessembinder (?) show that part of the fall in spreads
is due to mitigation of adverse selection. Traders are more willing to become informed.
Narrower spreads make it more likely that the efficient price is not within the spread,
and consequently there is inducement to uncover more information. If decimalization has
in fact improved incorporation of new information and prices are less sticky, we should
see more frequent adjustments. However, since the information inflow into a market is
not a function of tick-size, the overall amount flowing into the market may not change
36
significantly. Decimalization should not have a significant impact on the information shares
of different venues.
With smaller tick-sizes, a systemic effect may be observed. Small informational shocks
which would not have moved prices would now cause changes. When larger tick-sizes are
in effect, a price change in a venue must be incorporated by other markets in its entirety. For
example, if a tick of 12.5 cents is in force and one venue increases its prices by this amount
the other venues that wish to revise their prices must also change by the same amount or in
multiples of this tick. There is no opportunity for them to compete by revising their prices
gradually in small amounts. They are constrained by the minimum tick to make a change
equal to the entire 12.5 cents or not at all. However, if a tick of 1 cent is available, then if one
market changes its price by a large amount like 12.5 cents the other venues can gradually
change their prices by one cent at a time instead of the full 12.5 cents as would have been
necessary in the earlier case. This would mean that the prices will take a much longer time
to converge or stabilize. The cointegrated system would take a much longer time to reach
a new equilibrium level. This, in turn, will prolong the effect of any shock, and the system
would oscillate longer before stabilizing. The changes to the efficient price would persist
much longer, since the markets can now make a series of minor responses to a change at
another venue. The effect of such a change in the microstructure can be measured by the
duration of the impulse responses.These effects can be tested by following two hypotheses:
H1a: The impulse responses of the permanent components would take significantly longer
periods to converge after decimalization.
H1b: The information share of markets will not be significantly affected by decimalization.
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4.2 Information Share Distribution and Regulation FD
Historically firms disclosed information to selected securities analysts, investment profes-
sionals, and institutional investors before publicly announcing it. This results in abnormal
profits to those individuals at the cost of the general public. Trading by such informed
traders would introduce this new information first into their preferred markets. This would
increase the information share of these markets. However, if information is released to all
the participants at the same time, then we should see increased parity in the information
share of markets. In general, informed traders tend to be institutional investors, investment
professionals, and other such large investors, whereas uninformed investors, tend to be
small investors. Though there is no compelling reason as to where informed investors
trade, the order flow from small investors tends to be directed to regional exchanges. The
regional exchanges offer incentives to brokers for directing order flow to the regionals.
The small investors by virtue of being uninformed are more likely to be directed by their
brokers to satellite exchanges. The stated purpose of Regulation FD is to eliminate the
informational advantage accruing from selective disclosure. Since the privileged parties
are large investors, the net effect should be a significant increase in the information share
of satellites. Studies have shown that adverse selection costs have fallen due to less
information asymmetry and the accuracy of analysts’ forecasts has decreased, subsequent
to the implementation of Reg. FD. The potential for change in information contributions
of markets yields two hypotheses:
H2a: The differences in information shares of markets will decrease significantly after
Reg. FD.
H2b: Impulse responses durations will not be affected by Reg. FD.
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CHAPTER 5
Data and Methodology
5.1 Sample Selection
The principal aim of this study is to estimate the effects of decimalization and Regulation
FD; therefore, quotes from periods before and after the implementation of these changes
were used. Regulation FD was implemented on October 23, 2000, but the decimalization
of stock prices was done in phases starting in August 2000, when the NYSE started trading
seven stocks in decimals. Decimalization was extended to 57 stocks in September and by
February of 2001 all the NYSE stocks made the changeover. The SEC mandated that all
exchanges must complete the implementation by April 2001. The phased implementation
of decimalization, causes an overlap in the sample. In order to separate the effects of FD
and decimalization, a sample of stocks, when their quotes are not in decimals but are subject
to Regulation FD, has been selected.
The sample selection methods vary across investigators. Hasbrouck (?) collected three
months of observations for the thirty stocks of the DJIA. He then used a sampling interval
of one second. The issue of the sampling rate is of considerable importance. Yan and
Zivot (?) and Baillie et al. (?) have shown that the Hasbrouck measure is affected
by the contemporaneous correlation between disturbances. Hence, a high sampling rate
is required for the Hasbrouck measure. Huang (?), however, uses an interval of one
minute over a period of one month. The Gonzalo-Granger measure, with its focus on
error-correction mechanism, is not sensitive to contemporaneous correlation, and sampling
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frequency is not critical. Harris et al. (?), who employ this measure, introduce a method
called REPLACE ALL. They observe the last exchange in their sample to open trading and
take that trade and align it with the closest trades from the other exchanges. This would
constitute one tuple of the time series. Then they wait for all the exchanges to trade. Once
again, the last trade is selected and the nearest trades are aligned to it. Another method used
by them is to minimize the time span between trades. However, there is some arbitrariness
in the assignment of sequential order in both these methods. Though this is not critical to
the Gonzalo-Granger measure, such an alignment process can introduce some artifacts into
the Hasbrouck measure because of its sensitivity to contemporaneous correlation.
This paper follows the sampling method of Hasbrouck (?). Three months of quotes for the
components of the DJIA are collected from the TAQ database. However, some of the stocks
are not traded on the NYSE; hence, the sample covers twenty-five stocks. The pre-event
sample period can be the same for measuring both effects. I chose a three-month window
from October 25 to December 24, 1999 as the pre-event sample. The post-implementation
period for FD is determined by the implementation of decimalization since the sample
should be free of decimal effects. The period from October 25 to December 24, 2000 is
a period when FD is in force but only a few stocks on the NYSE are decimalized. This
period would also serve as the pre-decimalization sample. The post-decimalization sample
is collected from May 25, 2001 to August 24, 2001. The choice of October to December
is kept constant for the pre-FD and pre-decimalization periods to eliminate any seasonal
effects.
Following Hasbrouck (?), the data is sampled at a frequency of one second and the time
series are aligned by time stamp. The procedure is to create a series of time stamps at
one-second intervals from 9:30 A.M. to 3:45 P.M. Next, the time stamps of data from TAQ
are compared, and if there is a match, the associated quote is included. If not, the previous
quote is still prevailing, and that is included as the observation. For example, if at 10:45:10
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there is a quote of $35, this is included in the time series, but if there is no quote at that
time, it means that the quote at 10:45:09 is still the prevailing quote since no impulse or
innovation has entered the market. Therefore, the quote at 10:45:09 is also the quote at
10:45:10. It is possible that a quote may persist for a relatively longer period. The high
sampling rate has the advantage of eliminating contemporaneous correlation. The sampling
rate can be varied to examine the effects of correlation. Another sampling method used
in this paper is to align data from different exchanges by minimizing the time difference
between them. That is, data is merged on date and minimum time difference between
observations from different exchanges. This will produce a sample similar to Harris et al.
(?), but it will also distort the sequential order of observations.
The previous literature is concerned exclusively with information shares. This study
examines the changes in information share levels. The purpose is to examine whether
regulations have achieved their avowed purpose. Particularly in the case of FD, I examine
the parity between the information available to the general public and to privileged experts.
It may be argued that quote data to some extent may reflect expert opinion; therefore, trades
may truly reflect the information available to actual lay traders. However analysis of trades
is beset by additional problems such as the bid-ask bounce. This is a critical drawback for
a study that attempts to decompose the variance of prices.
5.2 Estimation
This study follows Hasbrouck (?) and estimates a VMA model, though Baillie et al. (?)
show that information share estimates obtained from estimating a VECM are similar to
those obtained from a VMA model, and as noted earlier, estimating a VECM is relatively
easier. The reason is that the impulse response functions that are an essential part of this
investigation, would in any case require a VMA representation.
The programs used for the estimations are modifications of the routines provided by
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Hasbrouck and were used for his 2001 study of intraday price formation. The price series
used for the Information Share measure (i.e., Hasbrouck measure) consist of bid and ask
quotes from the NYSE as the leading exchange, with Cincinnati and Boston as the two
regional exchanges. The basic error correction equation of order k can be written as
∆pt = γ(zt − µz) + A1∆pt−1 + A2∆pt−2 + A3∆pt−3 + . . .+ Ak∆pt−k + ut (5.1)
where pt = [p1t p2t p3t]
′ since there are three series, ut is the disturbance vector with
covariance E[ut u
′
t] = Ω, γ(zt − µz) consists of the error correction terms, and γ is the
vector of speeds of adjustment. The cointegrating vectors are in zt. That is,
zt =
 p1t − p2t
p1t − p3t
 = Fpt (5.2)
where F = [i − I2] and i is a vector of ones. The VMA representation of the model
is ∆pt = B0ut + B1ut−1 + B2ut−2 + . . . + Bkut−k where B0 = I . If we assume that
∆pt = 0 and zt = ut at times t = −1,−2,−3, . . ., and if at time t = 0 there is a unit shock
u0 = [100]
′ , then since ∆pt = 0 at t = 0, we have ∆p0 = [1 0 0]
′ and
lz0 = µz + F∆p0 (5.3)
∆p1 = A1∆p0 + γz0
z1 = z0 + F∆p1
∆p2 = A1∆p1 + A2∆p0 + γz1
In the VMA representation, the first column of B0 is ∆p0 and the first column of B1 is
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∆p1, etc. To obtain the second columns of B0, B1 etc., the system is forecasted for shocks
u0 = [0 1 0]
′ and u0 = [1 0 0]
′ . The cumulative impulse response functions are then Ck =
k∑
i=0
Bk. When the B’s are written at the lag polynomial B(L), then C is equivalent to B(1),
and the rows of C are identical. The variance of the random walk component of the prices
is σw2 = cΩc
′ and the information share of the ith market ISi =
c2i σ
2
i
σw2
. If the covariance
matrix Ω is not diagonal, then all the orderings of the Cholesky Decomposition must be
computed. In this study we have three such orderings.
The code implementation is as follows. The matrix consisting of three columns of prices
and the date and time stamps is first sorted by date and time. Next, a file containing pointers
to the prices by time and date is constructed. This is necessary since the markets open and
close daily, and the VECM is not valid across days because of the overnight breaks in the
price paths. The estimation is done for each day and the results are aggregated for the
entire sample. Once the price data is sorted and a pointer file has been created, a macro
extracts the prices for a single day by means of the pointer file. This single-day data is
then transposed, and the SAS procedure Proc Expand is used to transform the data to the
required interval of one second. For example, if there is a quote for 10:15:35 and there is
no quote for 10:15:36, then it can be assumed the quote prevailing at the previous second
still holds. Therefore, the quote at 10:15:35 is inserted for 10:15:36 also. This further
ensures that all the price vectors are of equal length. The VECM is then estimated for this
set of prices, and the output is stored in a temporary directory. Next the vector moving
average representation of the VECM is constructed, and the impulse response functions are
obtained by Proc Model solve statement. The code for the random walk analysis computes
the information shares. The whole process is looped over all the days in the dataset, and
the results are aggregated with Proc Means.
The Gonzalo-Granger measure is estimated for two price series. This study investigates
whether regulatory shocks such as FD and decimalization have any effect. Thus, it is
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sufficient to show that a regulation has had an effect or not; hence, a bivariate price vector is
adequate. Since the G&G measure is a linear combination of the coefficients of the lagged
variables, implementation differs in the sense that we are now estimating the weights or
coefficients of the random walk component. It is not necessary to estimate the impulse
response functions, which are essentially obtained from the covariance matrix.
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CHAPTER 6
Empirical Results
This chapter describes the analysis of the data and discusses the results of the various tests
conducted to establish or refute the hypotheses of this thesis. The tests can be broadly
divided into two sections. The first consists of tests on the compliance of the data with
the basic assumptions. The more critical tests to establish the hypotheses and discussion
of results are in the next section. For ease of reference, the tables enumerating the less
important results of the data compliance tests, are provided separately in Appendix A. The
results of all of the tests are discussed in separate subsections.
6.1 Data Compliance Tests
6.1.1 Unit Root Tests
The basic assumption in any analysis that employs a vector error correction model is that
the data variables entering the vector must be integrated series. That is, the series must be
non-stationary, containing one or more unit roots (Note: in a vector autoregressive (VAR)
model the series must be stationary). {Xt} = (X1, X2, X3, . . . , Xt)
′
where {Xt} is a nx1
vector with x1, x2, x3, etc., being variables representing n time series. It is absolutely
critical that these variables be integrated of the same order. The series are assumed to
be random walks. In this case, the data represents bid and ask quotes from the Boston,
Cincinnati and New York stock exchanges, and the assumption is that they are integrated
of order one, i.e., I(1).
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The most popular method of testing for unit roots is the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF)
Test. A description of the test is provided in Appendix E. The test essentially regresses the
first difference of the variable against a set of lagged variables of itself. The distribution
of the test statistic was developed by Dickey and Fuller (1981). There are several software
packages that conduct this test. The ADF tests in this thesis were conducted using EViews.
Table A.1 outlines the results of the unit root tests on the data series for 1999 for the
twenty-five stock quotes on three exchanges. The null hypothesis is that the series contains
a unit root. The value of the test statistic and the critical values from the Dickey-Fuller
distribution are set forth in the table. In all cases, i.e., for all the twenty-five stock quotes
on each exchange, we cannot reject the hypothesis that they contain a unit root. Tables A.2
and A.3 describe the results of the ADF test for data from 2000 and 2001. The results are
similar in that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of a unit root. The tests were actually
conducted separately for the bid and ask series; these tables contain the consolidated results.
The data complies with the basic requirement of being integrated of order one.
6.1.2 Granger Causality Tests
Subsequent to verifying that the data series are non-stationary, it is necessary to show that
they are related. That is, if one series is subjected to a disturbance, the shock should be
communicated to other series in the system. In other words, changes to one series cause
changes in another series, or else we may have a set of unrelated non-stationary series.
Unless there is causality between the series, we can model neither a VAR nor a VECM.
This causal relationship is usually referred to as Granger causality.
In general, Granger causality establishes whether past innovations in one series affect the
current value of another series. If such an effect exists then one series is said to Granger
cause the other. Granger causality should not be confused with exogeneity. As mentioned,
the past values of one series affect the current values of another series, whereas in
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determining exogeneity it is sufficient if there is no contemporaneous correlation. Granger
causality is limited to linear causal effects. Any non-linear causality cannot be detected by
these tests. If we have two series {Xt} and {Zt}, Granger causality examines whether past
values of {Xt} can help predict the current value of {Zt}. The test usually takes the form
of a series of F-tests. A regression of the differenced series {Zt} on its own lagged values
is performed first, and then lagged values of {Xt} are added to this equation to examine
whether they add any explanatory power. If they do, then {Xt}Granger-causes {Zt}. Table
A.4 shows the results of Granger causality tests on the data series for 1999. ”BBid” denotes
the bid series from the Boston Stock exchange, ”CBid” stands for Cincinnati and ”NBid”
for NYSE. ”BOfr”, ”COfr”, and ”NOfr” have similar interpretations. The null hypothesis
of these tests is that the series in question does not Granger-cause the other. Tests were
conducted in a pair-wise fashion for all the series. For brevity a synopsis of the results is
provided in the table. The p-values show that the null hypothesis of no causality can be
rejected in all the cases. Tables A.5 and A.6 shows the results for the 2000 and 2001 series
respectively. As is noted the series do Granger-cause one another. This is also a required
data characteristic.
6.1.3 Cointegration Tests
It is not sufficient to establish that the variables contain a unit root and are causally related.
A more formal test than the preliminary Granger causality test is required to establish
cointegration. After ascertaining that the data series are integrated by means of unit root
tests , it is now essential to verify whether they do form a cointegrated system of variables,
i.e., they share a common trend (Stock and Watson 1988). In order to be cointegrated,
the quote series must share a common stochastic trend, which proxies for the unobserved
efficient price. Tests are required not only to establish cointegration but also to estimate
the number of cointegrating vectors that possibly exist. This is crucial since if more than
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one such cointegrating relationship exists, we would need to estimate all possible linear
combinations of these vectors to arrive at an estimate of the information shares. This would
require all possible rotations to be considered. In general, if there are n series in the VECM,
then a possible maximum of (n− 1) cointegrating vectors could exist.
Engle and Granger devised a method for verifying whether a set of non-stationary variables
is cointegrated. However, this method suffers from a few drawbacks (discussed in
Appendix E). The method used in this study was devised by Johansen. This methodology
consists of a pair of tests called the Trace and Maximum Eigen Value Tests (a description of
the tests is included in Appendix E). It is a multi-stage testing procedure, where the system
of quote series is first tested under a null hypothesis of “at most one cointegrating vector”.
If this can be rejected, we proceed to testing under a null of “at most two cointegrating
vectors” and so on. If for example, we reject the presence of “at most n cointegrating
vectors,” but we cannot reject the null of “at most (n + 1) cointegrating vectors” then we
may conclude that n+ 1 cointegrating vectors, exist. Table A.7 displays the results for the
quote series for 1999, and the cointegrated system consists of the quote sequences from
the Boston stock exchange, the Cincinnati stock exchange and the NYSE. Both Trace and
Maximum Eigen Value tests show that we can reject that at most one cointegrating vector
exists but we cannot reject that at most two such vectors exist. We can conclude that there
are two cointegrating relationships. This is in accord with the theoretical estimate that an n-
variable system will have at most (n−1) cointegrating relationships. But more importantly,
it is necessary to know that there is no unique relationship, as it is now necessary to consider
the different rotations of the cointegrating vector. Tables A.8 and A.9 show the results of the
tests for the quote series from 2000 and 2001. These results also lead us to the conclusion
that at most two cointegrating vectors exist. This now concludes the section on tests of data
compliance.
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6.2 Information Share and Impulse Response Estimates
This and subsequent sections constitute the essence of this investigation. Two measures
of information share of markets, the Hasbrouck or IS measure and the Gonzalo-Granger
or G&G/PT measure, have been used in this study. The information shares estimations
employ different methodologies, as their definition of information differs. However, there
are some similarities, and this has been discussed earlier. The estimates of information
shares by both these measures and the impulse response durations are set out and discussed
in this section.
6.2.1 Hasbrouck (IS) Measure of Information Share
The Hasbrouck methodology for estimating relative information share of markets is
essentially a method of apportioning the variance around the efficient price to each
venue. From the earlier Pt = P0 + Θ(1)
t∑
i=1
ei + Θ
∗(L)et discussion on cointegration,
a vector autoregressive process has an equivalent infinite vector moving average (VMA)
representation. The Hasbrouck method exploits this property to initial VECM, i.e., as
an equivalent VMA i.e., Pt = P0 + Θ(1)
t∑
i=1
ei + Θ
∗(L)et and the stochastic trend is
θ
′
et = θ1e1t + θ2e2t. The information share then can be computed as
ISi =
θ2i σ
2
i
θΣθ′
=
θ2i σ
2
i
θ21σ
2
1 + θ
2
2σ
2
2
(6.1)
Since it has been established from the cointegration tests that there are two cointegration
vectors, the different rotations will yield an estimate of the upper and lower limits of the IS
information share. Both Hasbrouck (??) and Baillie et al. (?) suggest using the midpoint as
a measure of the information share. The data series consists of observations over each day,
and the break in trading between days imposes an estimation problem. The VECM will
not hold over the trading breaks; therefore, daily estimates are aggregated over the entire
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sample period for both the upper and lower limits.
The estimates of the maximum and the minimum IS information share for the 1999 bid
series and the standard errors are contained in Table 7.1. This is the period when neither
Reg. FD nor decimalization was implemented. The results show the estimates of the
information share for each of the twenty-five stocks at the Boston stock exchange, the
Cincinnati stock exchange, and the NYSE. The standard errors show that the estimates are
highly significant. Not surprisingly, NYSE contributes the bulk of the new information,
i.e., from 80-95%. The next highest is Cincinnati, which contributes 10-15%, and finally
Boston with about 2-5%. It must be noted that these measures are relative and do not
actually measure the exact amount of information in the market. The measure simply
decomposes the variance of the efficient price and attributes a percentage of it to each
market. If more markets are included, then the shares will change. This study measures
changes to the contributions of each market, rather than absolute information shares. Table
7.2 contains the information shares for the offer series from 1999. Once again, we see
a similar distribution of information shares among the three markets. Tables 7.3 and
7.4 contain the estimates for the bid and ask series from 2000, which covers the period
when only Reg.FD was in force. Tables 7.5 and 7.6 show the estimates from 2001, when
decimalization has been fully implemented. The midpoints of these estimates will be used
in tests for changes.
6.2.2 Gonzalo-Granger (G&G/PT) Measure of Information Share
The theoretical underpinnings of this measure have been discussed in detail earlier. In
essence, the proxies for the information shares are the coefficients or weights of the
permanent component of the vector error correction process. A VECM representation such
as ∆Xt = γβ
′
Xt−1 +
∞∑
i=1
Γi∆Xt−i+et can be decomposed into permanent and transient or
stationary components as Xt = A1ft + A2zt. A1ft is the non stationary component where
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ft = γ
′
⊥Xt and the component share ISi =
α⊥,i
α⊥,1+α⊥,2
.
The Gonzalo-Granger measure was estimated using a bivariate VECM, since the object
of this study is not a comparison of both measures, but the effect of market changes
on relative information shares. Since this approach does not require a rotation of the
cointegrating vectors, and also as a variation in approach, the model was not estimated
over each day. Instead, the data was pooled into a single matrix. As there is no rotation,
a single estimate instead of upper and lower limits is reported. The model was estimated
between the Cincinnati exchange and the NYSE. Table 7.7 shows the estimates for the bid
and ask series for 1999 for the Cincinnati exchange and the NYSE. The GG measure differs
considerably in its estimates from the Hasbrouck measure. It often attributes the entire
information share to the NYSE, as there are several estimates where the share is 100%.
This is indeed an overestimate. One reason could be in the drawbacks of the measure itself.
In the comparative study of the performance of the two measures by Hasbrouck (?), the
G&G measure had invariably incorrectly estimated the statistical parameters of the series,
and even estimating the information share, it grossly underestimated the share of the one
market while overestimating the share of the other (refer to case 3). Another reason could
be that both the Cincinnati exchange and the NYSE lost share to the Boston exchange and
the Cincinnati exchange could have lost a relatively larger share. The same trend is seen in
Tables 7.8 and 7.9, which show the estimates for the series from 2000 and 2001.
6.2.3 Impulse Response Functions
The impulse response functions are generated from the VMA representation. They describe
how a shock to one series is communicated to the other series in a cointegrated system,
and how long it takes for the system to return to equilibrium. Initially, the system is in
equilibrium and when a shock is imparted to one variable, it is communicated to other
series due to the interlinked nature of a cointegrated system. The shock may be considered
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as partly transient and partly permanent. The permanent portion is incorporated into
the common stochastic trend, and the transient part dies out. The values of the other
series respond to the permanent component, and the system reaches a new equilibrium
as innovations to the constituent series converge.
The impulse responses are successive derivatives of the VMA with respect to system time.
The system is first at equilibrium and unit shock or one standard deviation shock is imparted
to one variable. The future values of the changes to each variable are now estimated from
the infinite VMA representation. The changes communicated via the disturbance terms and
the values of the variables keep changing with each successive cycle until they converge,
and the system stabilizes at a new equilibrium. This would be the effective innovation to
the common stochastic trend.
In the present model, the variables are quote series from the Boston stock exchange, the
Cincinnati stock exchange and the NYSE. The VMA representation of the VECM is first
obtained, and then a unit impulse is delivered to each market in turn. The perturbations are
now forecast with the VMA to observe the changes to the disturbance terms. A graphical
representation of the impulse responses can be seen in Figures A.1, A.2, and A.3. They
are a representative sample of the 450 such impulse response graphs. The top left panel
of Figure A.1 shows the effect of a unit impulse to the Boston exchange bid series. The
greater part of the impulse dies out very quickly within the first 10 to 60 cycles, but some
effect persists for a longer time before the three series converge. It can be noticed that
the other two series do not respond to any large extent to an impulse to Boston. This
unit impulse can be interpreted as a quote change in Boston, and since its information
contribution is minimal, it is not surprising that the other two quotes do not move much.
Consequently, the new equilibrium level of efficient price has not changed by very much.
The picture is very different in the case of the third panel on the left. Here a unit impulse
is delivered to the NYSE quote, and the other two respond by rising rapidly, i.e., they
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are quickly incorporating the new information entering the system via an innovation to the
NYSE quotes. Convergence occurs at a large distance from the original rest level. The
system retains most of the innovation, and the new equilibrium or efficient price reflects
this. Again, this is consistent with the information share of the NYSE, which contributes
more than 90% of new information. The other figures are further examples of the impulse
response functions.
Table 7.10 shows the estimates of the impulse responses after a unit shock is delivered to
the Boston bid series from 1999. The first column lists the names of the stocks, and the
next three columns show the values where convergence took place. The last column is
of critical importance since it shows the number of cycles it took for convergence to be
reached. These numbers seem rather large, given that markets adjust within a very short
time. In real markets, the minimum step size for a change is the tick, i.e., if the tick is
10 cents, then all changes take place at steps of 10 or higher. Any finer granulation cannot
be observed. However, in econometric analysis we can set the convergence tolerance to
an arbitrarily high level. This would require more cycles before the convergence criterion
is satisfied. Setting such fine tolerance levels makes it possible to measure difference in
convergence times. The convergence criterion is set to about five decimal places.
Table 7.11 shows the impulse responses and convergence times after a unit impulse is
delivered to the Cincinnati series from 1999, and Table 7.12 describes the effects of a unit
impulse to the NYSE series. From the values, it can be seen that the impulse to Boston loses
about 94-97% of its value, by the time convergence is reached, whereas Cincinnati loses
about 85-90% of its value, and the NYSE impulse loses only about 10%. The results show
that the impulses to Boston and Cincinnati have a relatively smaller impact on the efficient
price i.e., the shock goes down after some time to a small fraction. However, an impulse
the NYSE series retains most of its effect. This is to be expected, since the NYSE is the
dominant market where you expect informed traders to participate. Hence, any innovations
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in this market will have a large impact on the efficient price. This is again consistent with
the information share contributions of each market. These tables report how long the the
efficient price evolves before the system stabilizes. Note that these are innovations to the
efficient price and as such have a permanent effect on the long run equilibrium price. This
is in contrast to a VAR, where all the components are stationary, and any such shock dies
out after some time.
The impulse responses from the bid series from 2000 are shown in Tables 7.13, 7.14, and
7.15 for a unit impulse to the Boston stock exchange, the Cincinnati exchange, and the
NYSE respectively. This is the period when Reg. FD was implemented but decimalization
was not. Consistent with Hypothesis 2b, the convergence rates do not seem to have changed
much. However, in agreement with Hypothesis 2a, the level, i.e., the value at which the
convergence occurs, is much higher. This shows that the dominance of the NYSE has
somewhat diminished compared to 1999. This is consistent with the regional markets now
contributing more to price discovery due to Reg. FD.
The results for the bid series from 2001, i.e., the period when decimalization was
implemented, are shown in Tables 7.16 to 7.18. It can be immediately noticed that the time
taken for convergence is very much longer than for earlier periods. This result is consistent
with Hypothesis 1a. Decimalization allows markets to improve their prices in much smaller
steps, and therefore convergence takes longer. The levels at which convergence takes place
do not show much difference from the 2000 series, which is again consistent with the
assumption that decimalization does not impact the information share of markets.
Tables 7.19 to 7.27 show the results for the three periods i.e., 1999, 2000, and 2001, for the
offer series. Though investigators have found the off-NYSE offers to be more aggressive,
the results are similar to the bid series.
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6.3 Hypothesis Tests
These tests are the essence of this thesis. They test the main hypothesis and establish
whether the data substantiates the premise on which this research rests.
6.3.1 Test of Hypotheses 1a and 2b
These hypotheses propose that “the impulse responses will take a significantly longer time
to converge after Decimalization” and “Impulse responses durations will not be affected
by Reg. FD.”. These propositions were tested by conducting two sample t-tests of the mean
convergence times for the impulse responses from the pre- and post-decimalization periods,
i.e., 1999, 2000, and 2001. A cursory glance at the convergence times from Tables 7.10-
7.12 (1999 bid series), 7.13-7.15 (2000 bid series), and Tables 7.16-7.18 (2001 bid series)
indicates that while there is no significant change between 1999 and 2000 there is indeed a
significant change between 2000 and 2001.
The results of a formal t-test of the mean convergence times between the pre-decimalization
periods of 1999 and 2000 and the post-decimalization period of 2001 are tabulated in Table
7.32, 7.33, 7.34, and 7.35. The tests of Hypothesis 2b are in Tables 7.32 and 7.33 for the
bid and offer series, respectively. The results are t-tests between the mean convergence
times between 1999 and 2000 when decimalization was not implemented and only Reg.
FD was in force. The first row shows the result of the t-test for a unit impulse to the Boston
exchange from 1999 and 2000. The differences for the bid series as well as the offer series
are not significant since the p-values are 0.44 and 0.95, respectively. The other two rows
show the results for the Cincinnati exchange and the NYSE. Both show that there is no
significant change in the convergence times with p-values of 0.3 and 0.103, respectively,
for the bid series and 0.86 and 0.67, for the offer series. The last column reports the results
for a test of equal variances. The results are consistent with the hypothesis.
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Tables 7.34 and 7.35 show the results of the t-tests of Hypothesis 1a, corresponding to
difference in mean convergence times between 2000 and 2001, for the bid and offer series.
The rows as before correspond to the Boston stock exchange, the Cincinnati stock exchange
and the NYSE. Here the results are dramatically different. The bid series in Table 7.34
shows impulse response convergence times take a significantly longer time to converge in
the post-decimalization period i.e., 2001. The post-pre mean difference is significant, with
a p-value of less than 0.0001. The results are the same for the other two markets. Table 7.35
tabulates the results for the offer series. These results are in strong support of Hypothesis
1a. Moreover, it must be noted that while there is a time interval of a full year between
the data from 1999 and 2000, only three months elapsed between the data from 2000 and
2001, and the only significant event that occurred during this time is decimalization.
6.3.2 Test of Hypotheses 1b and 2a
Hypothesis 1b
The information shares that are used in these tests were estimated using the two metrics,
i.e., the Hasbrouck or IS measure and the Gonzalo-Granger or G&G/PT measure.
Hypotheses 1b states that “information share of markets will not be significantly affected by
decimalization.” Panel 3 of Table 7.28 tests this proposition. We see that during the period
of 2000-2001 when decimalization was implemented, the mean information share did not
change. The p-values for the share of the Boston exchange, the Cincinnati exchange and
the NYSE are 0.37, 0.57 and 0.88, respectively. Panel 3 of Table 7.29 shows the results of
the t-test for the offer series during the same period. The results are not so unambiguous
here; while Cincinnati shows no difference (p-value = 0.62), Boston and NYSE do show a
significant difference (p-values 0.038 and 0.027). There could be several reasons for such
results; as noted earlier, investigators have documented more aggressive offer-side behavior
from off-NYSE exchanges. Another reason might be that the effects of decimalization were
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gradual, in that all stocks were not converted at the same time.
Hypothesis 2a
This hypothesis states that “differences in information shares of markets will decrease
significantly after Reg. FD.”. That is, the share of the so-called satellite or regional
exchanges would increase while the share of the dominant market would decrease after
implementation of Reg. FD. This is to be expected if the regulation has achieved its goal
of introducing a more even playing field. Tables 7.28 and 7.29 document the tests of
information share changes for the IS measure, while Tables 39 and 40 tabulate the results
for the G&G/PT measure.
Panel 1 of Table 7.28 shows the tests of the Reg. FD period, i.e., 1999-2000 for the bid
series. The Boston market has increased its share, and the difference is significant (p-
value = 0.027,) and NYSE share has decreased significantly (p-value = 0.001). However,
Cincinnati has also lost share, the decrease is significant (p-value = 0.0001). This is an
unexpected result. A possible reason could be that both the NYSE and the Cincinnati
exchange have lost information share to the Boston exchange. That is, some of the informed
traders may have moved to Boston. The results for the offer series are documented in panel
1 of Table 7.29. Once again Boston has increased its information share whereas Cincinnati
has lost its share. The result for the NYSE share is borderline significant at the 5% level.
It would seem that more information share was lost by Cincinnati to Boston than to the
NYSE. The reasons could be the subject for a separate investigation.
Tables 7.30 and 7.31 contain the results of tests for the G&G/PT measure of information
for the bid and offer series, respectively. Panel 1 of Table 7.30 shows that the G&G
measure was unable to capture any significant difference in information share during the
Reg. FD period (p-value = 0.64,) but there seems to be a significant difference during the
decimalization period (Table 7.30, panel 2, p-value = 0.03). The offer series in Table 7.31
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shows the opposite results, with the Reg. FD period being significant at the 10% level
(p-value = 0.6), and the decimalization period being insignificant (p-value = 0.55). G&G
measure suffers from mis-estimation defects as demonstrated by Hasbrouck. Besides this,
the estimation is over a bivariate VECM involving Cincinnati which has exhibited slightly
anomalous behavior as seen also in the IS measure.The analysis should perhaps be done
pairwise between all the three exchanges.
6.4 Impulse Response Differences Between Contemporaneous Bid-Offer
Though it is not germane to the main questions of this thesis, as a precaution, differences in
convergence times of the bid and offer series were tested. The results are shown in Tables
7.36, 7.37, and 7.38. The tests show that there was no difference in the convergence times
of impulse responses between bid and offer series of the same period.
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CHAPTER 7
Summary and Conclusions
Markets exist for the purpose of exchange of assets. The formulation of explicit rules that
govern or control this process are of crucial importance to efficiently pricing traded assets.
Market crashes and similar financial crises have spurred regulatory bodies into passing
a raft of regulations. However, in their haste to avert the recurrence of such events, the
regulators may often promulgate flawed regulations. Far from achieving any improvement,
they may cause harm, which if left unnoticed may precipitate the very crises that they
are intended to prevent. It is imperative that mechanisms for testing newly implemented
regulations should be developed. This study is a step in that direction.
If prices are to be efficient, the price formation process has to incorporate new information
as quickly as possible. The quantity of information arriving in a market may not be
immediately reflected in prices. Bottlenecks are created by the trading rules; for example, if
the stipulated minimum change or tick is too large, small amounts of incoming information
will not immediately be incorporated. Such information must be accumulated until there
is a sufficient quantity to warrant a change. The widespread availability of information is
another issue that influences price formation. If information is differentially distributed,
i.e., participants are denied equal access to information, asymmetry is introduced. Such
flaws tend to make prices inefficient. Thus price discovery is sensitive to the trading rules
or structure of markets. Any regulations that affect any of these rules would in turn affect
the price discovery process.
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In the recent past, two such regulations have been implemented; one affecting the
distribution of information, i.e., Regulation Fair Disclosure, and the other affecting the
minimum mandated price change, i.e., decimalization of the tick-size. The motives
underlying both these changes are laudable. Both aim to improve the efficiency of markets.
But the question is whether they achieved this. There is a large body of literature on
tick-size, but its verdict on informational effects is inconclusive. Regulation FD, on the
other hand, has not received as much attention. The informational aspects have been
studied almost exclusively from the perspective of analysts’ forecast accuracy. Both these
regulatory changes have the potential for significant effects on the price discovery process
since, on one hand, they affect the trading mechanism, and on the other, the dissemination
of information.
This study uses a rather computationally demanding methodology to investigate the
informational and process effects of these two regulations. For any such effort, a reliable
metric or yardstick is required. Two such measures, though econometrically intensive,
seem to meet the requirements. One was developed by Joel Hasbrouck, a leading researcher
in microstructure, expressly to measure the information share of markets. The other has
evolved as an application of a time series analysis methodology developed the Nobel
laureate Clive Granger and Jesus Gonzalo. By using these measures, the information share
and response times of the markets before and after the implementation of regulations can
be measured. The changes or differences in these quantities would then indicate whether
these regulations have been effective or futile, or altogether undesirable.
The purpose of Regulation Fair Disclosure is to bring about a measure of equality in the
market. Hitherto, firms informed a select group of persons before informing the general
public. This has placed the “ordinary” trader under a considerable disadvantage. Reg. FD
is quite clear in what it wished to address:
. . . Issuer selective disclosure bears a close resemblance in this regard to
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ordinary “tipping” and insider trading. In both cases, a privileged few gain
an informational edge – and the ability to use that edge to profit – from their
superior access to corporate insiders, rather than from their skill, acumen, or
diligence. Likewise, selective disclosure has an adverse impact on market
integrity that is similar to the adverse impact from illegal insider trading:
investors lose confidence in the fairness of the markets when they know that
other participants may exploit “unerodable informational advantages” derived
not from hard work or insights, but from their access to corporate insiders. . .
If the regulation is successful, we should see greater parity in information distribution. This
would mean that the informed traders who operate in the dominant markets would lose
some of their advantage. The participants in other markets can also contribute information
gained through their own “. . . skill, acumen, or diligence.” The information contributions
of smaller venues should in fact increase. This is the theme that underlies the Hypothesis
2a: that after Reg. FD is implemented, the information share of smaller markets should
increase or the difference between the dominant and satellite markets should decrease. The
results have shown that there is reasonable evidence to conclude that Reg. FD has not been
a total failure. The information share of the dominant market, i.e., the NYSE did decrease
and the share of the satellite market increased. The evidence from the offer side indicates
the same conclusion.
However, the evidence could have been stronger. The information share of the Cincinnati
exchange has shown a decrease instead of an increase as expected. The fact that Cincinnati
is also a dominant market as compared to Boston could perhaps explain this result. The
information shares as measured by the G&G/PT measure have not shown any evidence
in support of Reg. FD. But as shown earlier, this measure was not expressly designed to
measure information shares. It is more an incidental use of a method developed by someone
who had a different purpose in mind. Overall, there is enough evidence to conclude that
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Regulation FD has been a reasonable success, if not a resounding one.
Changes to tick-size, in this case a comparatively large reduction in the minimum step
of price revision, should have a noticeable effect on the process of price formation. The
informational effect would be not one of quantity. It is more likely to affect the system
response to impulses, progress towards a new equilibrium, once a shock has disturbed it.
Hypothesis 1a addresses this question of the time it takes for the system to fully internalize
the permanent information contained in a shock and reach a new equilibrium. Since the
smaller tick-size allows smaller revisions, markets need not incorporate all the change in
another market at once. They could revise gradually, which would enable them to arrive at
equilibrium without losing any trading advantage. A precipitate change would place some
of the existing limit orders at a disadvantage, i.e., the price might trade through. A more
gradual rate of change would enable the market to execute its pending orders with much
smaller price shocks. This could be an inducement to traders.
The evidence in support of Hypothesis 1a very strong. All the tests, on the bid as well as
the offer side, show conclusively that the impulse responses take a much longer time to
converge. This means that once the existing equilibrium is disturbed, the system is taking
a longer time to reach a new equilibrium. This could be interpreted as meaning that a price
shock to any venue is more gradually incorporated by other venues after decimalization.
Whether this is an intended consequence of decimalization or not, is a debatable issue.
7.1 Limitations and Future Research
The cointegration approach used in this study is very sensitive to misspecification. This
could compromise the quality of the conclusions of the research. Aligning the quotes,
i.e., using the previous prevailing quote in the absence of a current quote, is not a
universally accepted method, though it is endorsed by one of the foremost microstructure
researchers. Only three markets have been used in this analysis and perhaps more price
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series would not only increase the accuracy of the results, but also make the conclusions
more universally applicable. In defense of this choice, it should be said that these three
markets have been chosen since they operate in the same time zone. Including markets that
open at different times would further exacerbate the already considerable timing issues.
Another limitation is the accuracy of time stamps. They determine the quality of data, and
Hasbrouck has documented evidence of some inaccuracies in data recording.
The evidence in support of Regulation Fair Disclosure is not as convincing as one would
have hoped for. The anomalous behavior of Cincinnati is puzzling. It could be that there
were transaction cost issues or some other factors that have introduced some obfuscation.
A more comprehensive model that also incorporates such effects could be an objective of
further research. It would have been highly desirable if the G&G/PT measure confirmed
the results of the Hasbrouck measure. It could be a drawback of the method itself, but
perhaps a greater refinement or a better algorithm would achieve better results.
The evidence on the effect of tick-size does not address the question of informational
effects either directly or completely. The approach only measures the convergence speeds,
i.e., the rate at which new equilibrium is reached. This is only indirect evidence of the
rate at which new information in one venue is incorporated by other venues. Subsequent
research should be directed towards addressing this issue directly. One approach would
be to compare adjustment coefficients, since they directly measure the size of the revision
to each component of the cointegrated system. However, there are no reliable tests that
would allow a direct comparison of speeds-of-adjustment. As it is, there is quite a degree
of complexity, which can introduce artifacts. A further complication, such as nesting or
pooling the periods, may only obscure the rather small effects. Brassi, Caporale & Hall
(2007) note that most of the existing methods of comparing adjustment coefficients only
establish the existence of a structural break. They cannot quantify the differences in speeds-
of-adjustment with sufficient accuracy to warrant any conclusions.
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Overall this study has in its small way added to the evidence that exists on the efficacy
of two major regulations. More importantly, it has introduced a novel use of two
existing measures. Most of the previous literature has only used cointegration analysis
to measure information shares, but none has used the estimates of the measures to test
other phenomena.
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Table 7.7: Information Share(PT/GG) Estimates - Series 1999
The table contains the information share estimates of the PT/GG
measure, for the Cincinnati and NYSE bid and offer series from 1999,
when both Reg. FD and decimalization were not implemented.
Cincinnati NYSE
Stock Bid Offer Bid Offer
Alcoa 0.00412 0.00524 0.99588 0.99476
AIG 0.00010 0.00000 0.99990 1.00000
Am Express 0.00000 0.00000 1.00000 1.00000
Boeing 0.00073 0.00000 0.99927 1.00000
BOA 0.00824 0.00000 0.99176 1.00000
Citigroup 0.01615 0.00000 0.98385 1.00000
Caterpillar 0.00000 0.00347 1.00000 0.99653
Chevron 0.00000 0.00143 1.00000 0.99857
Du Pont 0.00256 0.00182 0.99744 0.99818
Disney 0.06159 0.04206 0.93841 0.95794
GE 0.00180 0.00296 0.99820 0.99704
GM 0.00000 0.00964 1.00000 0.99036
Home Depot 0.00534 0.00145 0.99466 0.99855
IBM 0.00000 0.00225 1.00000 0.99775
J&J 0.00504 0.02228 0.99496 0.97772
JP Morgan 0.67197 0.00745 0.32803 0.99255
Coca-Cola 0.00000 0.00000 1.00000 1.00000
McDonald 0.00000 0.00000 1.00000 1.00000
3M 0.00000 0.00654 1.00000 0.99346
Merck 0.00000 0.01053 1.00000 0.98947
Pfizer 0.00000 0.00080 1.00000 0.99920
P&G 0.00316 0.01042 0.99684 0.98958
AT&T 0.00000 0.00365 1.00000 0.99635
UTX 0.00000 0.00963 1.00000 0.99037
Wal-Mart 0.00571 0.00052 0.99429 0.99948
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Table 7.8: Information Share(PT/GG) Estimates - Series 2000
The table contains the information share estimates of the PT/GG
measure, for the Cincinnati and NYSE bid and offer series from 2000,
when Reg. FD was implemented.
Cincinnati NYSE
Stock Bid Offer Bid Offer
Alcoa 0.009938 0.020822 0.990062 0.979179
AIG 0.059958 0.039789 0.940043 0.960211
Am Express 0.000000 0.008233 1.000000 0.991767
Boeing 0.038908 0.000000 0.961093 1.000000
BOA 0.015835 0.000629 0.984165 0.999371
Citigroup 0.001609 0.007348 0.998391 0.992652
Caterpillar 0.000000 0.001135 1.000000 0.998865
Chevron 0.028557 0.002442 0.971443 0.997558
Du Pont 0.024064 0.009453 0.975936 0.990547
Disney 0.087908 0.027140 0.912092 0.972860
GE 0.055394 0.018461 0.944606 0.981539
GM 0.000507 0.006040 0.999493 0.993960
Home Depot 0.034036 0.000000 0.965964 1.000000
IBM 0.010756 0.019564 0.989244 0.980436
J&J 0.000690 0.002900 0.999310 0.997100
JP Morgan 0.000000 0.008300 1.000000 0.991700
Coca-Cola 0.000000 0.007843 1.000000 0.992157
McDonald 0.027613 0.012343 0.972387 0.987657
3M 0.000000 0.003640 1.000000 0.996360
Merck 0.000000 0.000000 1.000000 1.000000
Pfizer 0.054870 0.099192 0.945130 0.900808
P&G 0.000000 0.028288 1.000000 0.971713
AT&T 0.005405 0.000000 0.994595 1.000000
UTX 0.002060 0.000000 0.997940 1.000000
Wal-Mart 0.008008 0.047519 0.991992 0.952481
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Table 7.9: Information Share(PT/GG) Estimates - Series 2001
The table contains the information share estimates of the PT/GG
measure, for the Cincinnati and NYSE bid and offer series from 2001,
when decimalization was implemented.
Cincinnati NYSE
Stock Bid Offer Bid Offer
Alcoa 0.067387 0.010907 0.932613 0.989093
AIG 0.000000 0.000000 1.000000 1.000000
Am Express 0.095653 0.024179 0.904347 0.975822
Boeing 0.000000 0.019687 1.000000 0.980313
BOA 0.184145 0.005418 0.815856 0.994582
Citigroup 0.060786 0.000000 0.939214 1.000000
Caterpillar 0.021963 0.016417 0.978037 0.983583
Chevron 0.000000 0.000000 1.000000 1.000000
Du Pont 0.040532 0.000000 0.959468 1.000000
Disney 0.000000 0.000000 1.000000 1.000000
GE 0.013303 0.004704 0.986698 0.995296
GM 0.009966 0.002127 0.990035 0.997873
Home Depot 0.000000 0.016957 1.000000 0.983043
IBM 0.171836 0.000000 0.828164 1.000000
J&J 0.040206 0.038534 0.959794 0.961466
JP Morgan 0.378080 0.000000 0.621920 1.000000
Coca-Cola 0.036379 0.049197 0.963621 0.950803
McDonald 0.000000 0.011956 1.000000 0.988044
3M 0.026932 0.003003 0.973068 0.996997
Merck 0.017416 0.001120 0.982584 0.998880
Pfizer 0.157017 0.000000 0.842983 1.000000
P&G 0.000000 0.270315 1.000000 0.729685
AT&T 0.000000 0.050559 1.000000 0.949441
UTX 0.349162 0.019087 0.650838 0.980914
Wal-Mart 0.019544 0.000000 0.980456 1.000000
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Table 7.10: Impulse Responses. Series 1999 Bid.
The table contains the convergence results after a unit impulse was
imparted to the Boston bid seriesfrom 1999. The first column
describes the stock and the next three columns give the value at which
convergence occurred. The last column shows the number of units of
time elapsed for convergence to be achieved.
Unit Impulse to Boston
Alcoa 0.0656 0.0656 0.0655 1835
AIG 0.0611 0.0611 0.0611 1146
Am Express 0.0892 0.0892 0.0892 1428
Boeing 0.0993 0.0689 0.0684 2000
BOA 0.0103 0.0102 0.0102 1963
Citigroup 0.0495 0.0498 0.0498 1909
Caterpillar 0.0530 0.0539 0.0540 1879
Chevron 0.0134 0.0134 0.0134 1662
Du Pont 0.0835 0.0835 0.0835 788
Disney 0.0429 0.0429 0.0429 1806
GE 0.0368 0.0368 0.0368 811
GM 0.0228 0.0259 0.0258 2000
Home Depot 0.0442 0.0473 0.0473 1375
IBM 0.0784 0.0784 0.0784 1081
J&J 0.0050 0.0051 0.0051 1867
JP Morgan 0.0846 0.0846 0.0846 1638
Coca-Cola 0.0556 0.0557 0.0557 1573
McDonald 0.2515 0.2504 0.2504 1675
3M 0.0128 0.0128 0.0128 832
Merck 0.0976 0.0977 0.0977 1636
Pfizer 0.0489 0.0489 0.0489 1236
P&G 0.0688 0.0688 0.0688 893
AT&T 0.0691 0.0691 0.0691 1524
UTX 0.0456 0.0461 0.0461 1725
Wal-Mart 0.0070 0.0068 0.0068 1769
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Table 7.11: Impulse Responses. Series 1999 Bid.
The table contains the convergence results after a unit impulse was
imparted to the Cincinnati bid series from 1999. The first column
describes the stock and the next three columns give the value at which
convergence occurred. The last column shows the number of units of
time elapsed for convergence to be achieved.
Unit Impulse to Cincinnati
Stock Boston Cincinnati NYSE Period
Alcoa 0.5181 0.5181 0.5180 1786
AIG 0.0521 0.0521 0.0521 1268
Am Express 0.1898 0.1898 0.1898 1394
Boeing 0.2932 0.2968 0.2969 2000
BOA 0.3023 0.3023 0.3023 1912
Citigroup 0.2317 0.2316 0.2317 1996
Caterpillar 0.2526 0.2530 0.2531 1824
Chevron 0.0049 0.0049 0.0049 1800
Du Pont 0.0805 0.0805 0.0805 799
Disney 0.0829 0.0829 0.0829 1946
GE 0.0910 0.0910 0.0910 774
GM 0.1070 0.1069 0.1069 2000
Home Depot 0.2170 0.2174 0.2174 1657
IBM 0.0788 0.0788 0.0788 842
J&J 0.1635 0.1634 0.1634 1577
JP Morgan 0.2285 0.2285 0.2285 1599
Coca-Cola 0.1421 0.1422 0.1422 1605
McDonald 0.0624 0.0624 0.0624 1730
3M 0.0703 0.0703 0.0703 768
Merck 0.2022 0.2023 0.2022 1667
Pfizer 0.1528 0.1528 0.1528 1279
P&G 0.0747 0.0747 0.0747 946
AT&T 0.1446 0.1446 0.1446 1677
UTX 0.3010 0.3009 0.3009 1830
Wal-Mart 0.1501 0.1501 0.1501 1827
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Table 7.12: Impulse Responses. Series 1999 Bid.
The table contains the convergence results after a unit impulse was
imparted to the NYSE bid series from 1999. The first column
describes the stock and the next three columns give the value at which
convergence occurred. The last column shows the number of units of
time elapsed for convergence to be achieved.
Unit Impulse to NYSE
Stock Boston Cincinnati NYSE Period
Alcoa 0.4887 0.4887 0.4888 1688
AIG 1.0295 1.0295 1.0295 1003
Am Express 1.0308 1.0308 1.0308 1298
Boeing 0.7440 0.7623 0.7626 2000
BOA 0.7239 0.7240 0.7240 1840
Citigroup 0.8330 0.8334 0.8334 1803
Caterpillar 0.7888 0.7890 0.7890 1922
Chevron 1.0471 1.0471 1.0471 1452
Du Pont 0.9093 0.9093 0.9093 630
Disney 0.7261 0.7261 0.7261 1872
GE 0.8257 0.8257 0.8257 479
GM 0.8139 0.8159 0.8158 1989
Home Depot 0.8660 0.8666 0.8666 1453
IBM 1.0216 1.0216 1.0216 947
J&J 0.9300 0.9304 0.9304 1562
JP Morgan 0.8798 0.8798 0.8798 1624
Coca-Cola 0.8651 0.8651 0.8651 1627
McDonald 0.7414 0.7422 0.7422 1686
3M 1.2417 1.2417 1.2417 610
Merck 0.8169 0.8168 0.8168 1614
Pfizer 0.9032 0.9032 0.9032 1141
P&G 0.9601 0.9601 0.9601 642
AT&T 1.0302 1.0303 1.0303 1478
UTX 0.7873 0.7877 0.7878 1779
Wal-Mart 0.8870 0.8871 0.8871 1811
77
Table 7.13: Impulse Responses. Series 2000 Bid.
The table contains the convergence results after a unit impulse was
imparted to the Boston bid series from 2000. The first column
describes the stock and the next three columns give the value at which
convergence occurred. The last column shows the number of units of
time elapsed for convergence to be achieved.
Unit Impulse to Boston
Stock Boston Cincinnati NYSE Period
Alcoa 0.034 0.033 0.033 1852
AIG 0.002 0.002 0.002 1305
Am Express 0.107 0.107 0.107 1388
Boeing 0.153 0.153 0.153 1442
BOA 0.005 0.009 0.006 1978
Citigroup 0.114 0.114 0.114 1531
Caterpillar 0.015 0.012 0.012 2000
Chevron 0.351 0.349 0.350 1997
Du Pont 0.021 0.021 0.021 1749
Disney 0.010 0.010 0.010 1995
GE 0.062 0.062 0.062 1976
GM 0.033 0.033 0.033 1732
Home Depot 0.042 0.042 0.042 1557
IBM 0.060 0.060 0.060 899
J&J 0.048 0.048 0.048 1597
JP Morgan 0.105 0.105 0.105 844
Coca-Cola 0.309 0.309 0.309 1924
McDonald 0.400 0.387 0.381 1990
3M 0.020 0.020 0.020 1374
Merck 0.012 0.012 0.012 1200
Pfizer 0.026 0.026 0.026 1749
P&G 0.060 0.059 0.060 1577
AT&T 0.120 0.120 0.120 1239
UTX 0.136 0.136 0.136 1760
Wal-Mart 0.021 0.021 0.021 1421
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Table 7.14: Impulse Responses. Series 2000 Bid.
The table contains the convergence results after a unit impulse was
imparted to the Cincinnati bid series from 2000. The first column
describes the stock and the next three columns give the value at which
convergence occurred. The last column shows the number of units of
time elapsed for convergence to be achieved.
Unit Impulse to Cincinnati
Stock Boston Cincinnati NYSE Period
Alcoa 0.183 0.183 0.183 1966
AIG 0.085 0.085 0.085 1381
Am Express 0.050 0.050 0.050 1600
Boeing 0.153 0.153 0.153 1533
BOA 0.122 0.106 0.118 2000
Citigroup 0.143 0.142 0.143 1747
Caterpillar 0.203 0.205 0.205 1970
Chevron 0.104 0.103 0.103 1967
Du Pont 0.200 0.200 0.200 1983
Disney 0.055 0.055 0.053 1995
GE 0.084 0.084 0.084 1601
GM 0.098 0.107 0.099 1984
Home Depot 0.020 0.020 0.020 1763
IBM 0.080 0.080 0.080 846
J&J 0.002 0.003 0.002 1314
JP Morgan 0.087 0.087 0.087 862
Coca-Cola 0.132 0.132 0.132 1905
McDonald 0.061 0.070 0.069 1995
3M 0.279 0.282 0.279 1506
Merck 0.253 0.253 0.253 1107
Pfizer 0.045 0.045 0.045 1789
P&G 0.281 0.281 0.281 1792
AT&T 0.036 0.036 0.036 1423
UTX 0.035 0.035 0.035 1754
Wal-Mart 0.069 0.069 0.069 1533
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Table 7.15: Impulse Responses. Series 2000 Bid.
The table contains the convergence results after a unit impulse was
imparted to the NYSE bid series from 2000. The first column
describes the stock and the next three columns give the value at which
convergence occurred. The last column shows the number of units of
time elapsed for convergence to be achieved.
Unit Impulse to NYSE
Stock Boston Cincinnati NYSE Period
Stock Boston Cincinnati Nyse Period
Alcoa 0.703 0.702 0.703 1930
AIG 1.012 1.012 1.012 1435
Am Express 1.062 1.062 1.062 1814
Boeing 0.957 0.957 0.957 1510
BOA 1.000 0.989 0.997 1995
Citigroup 1.296 1.296 1.296 1848
Caterpillar 0.652 0.652 0.653 1997
Chevron 0.644 0.646 0.646 1991
Du Pont 0.793 0.793 0.793 1966
Disney 0.879 0.879 0.881 1994
GE 0.951 0.951 0.951 1909
GM 0.884 0.872 0.884 1813
Home Depot 0.877 0.877 0.877 1526
IBM 1.237 1.237 1.237 881
J&J 1.012 1.012 1.012 1294
JP Morgan 0.985 0.985 0.985 625
Coca-Cola 0.847 0.847 0.847 1875
McDonald 0.316 0.318 0.326 1976
3M 0.684 0.682 0.684 1608
Merck 0.811 0.811 0.811 1205
Pfizer 0.903 0.902 0.903 1625
P&G 0.768 0.768 0.769 1569
AT&T 0.968 0.968 0.968 1233
UTX 1.180 1.180 1.180 1667
Wal-Mart 0.910 0.910 0.910 1604
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Table 7.16: Impulse Responses. Series 2001 Bid.
The table contains the convergence results after a unit impulse was
imparted to the Boston bid series from 2001. The first column
describes the stock and the next three columns give the value at which
convergence occurred. The last column shows the number of units of
time elapsed for convergence to be achieved.
Unit Impulse to Boston
Stock Boston Cincinnati NYSE Period
Alcoa 0.019 0.019 0.019 3750
AIG 0.051 0.051 0.051 3330
Am Express 0.275 0.275 0.275 3965
Boeing 0.047 0.047 0.047 2839
BOA 0.058 0.058 0.058 3419
Citigroup 0.023 0.024 0.025 2714
Caterpillar 0.114 0.114 0.115 3471
Chevron 0.059 0.059 0.059 1505
Du Pont 0.250 0.139 0.136 3886
Disney 0.101 0.130 0.141 3680
GE 0.078 0.079 0.079 1840
GM 0.063 0.063 0.063 3794
Home Depot 0.064 0.064 0.064 2219
IBM 0.038 0.038 0.038 2079
J&J 0.002 0.002 0.002 3788
JP Morgan 0.179 0.179 0.179 2474
Coca-Cola 0.077 0.077 0.077 3537
McDonald 0.316 0.306 0.300 2955
3M 0.064 0.064 0.064 2463
Merck 0.189 0.189 0.189 2872
Pfizer 0.081 0.080 0.079 3788
P&G 0.058 0.048 0.048 3928
AT&T 0.010 0.002 0.001 3394
UTX 0.052 0.052 0.052 2049
Wal-Mart 0.019 0.019 0.019 2793
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Table 7.17: Impulse Responses. Series 2001 Bid.
The table contains the convergence results after a unit impulse was
imparted to the Cincinnati bid series from 2001. The first column
describes the stock and the next three columns give the value at which
convergence occurred. The last column shows the number of units of
time elapsed for convergence to be achieved.
Unit Impulse to Cincinnati
Stock Boston Cincinnati NYSE Period
Alcoa 0.260 0.260 0.260 3604
AIG 0.039 0.039 0.039 3630
Am Express 0.086 0.086 0.086 3702
Boeing 0.050 0.050 0.050 1826
BOA 0.215 0.215 0.215 2788
Citigroup 0.011 0.010 0.010 2382
Caterpillar 0.002 0.006 0.002 2379
Chevron 0.044 0.044 0.044 1674
Du Pont 0.451 0.433 0.433 3190
Disney 0.054 0.060 0.062 3738
GE 0.095 0.095 0.095 2544
GM 0.065 0.066 0.065 3664
Home Depot 0.003 0.003 0.003 2096
IBM 0.015 0.015 0.015 1785
J&J 0.063 0.063 0.063 2448
JP Morgan 0.078 0.078 0.078 2352
Coca-Cola 0.135 0.135 0.135 3369
McDonald 0.150 0.148 0.146 3468
3M 0.001 0.001 0.001 2426
Merck 0.008 0.008 0.008 2557
Pfizer 0.064 0.064 0.064 3761
P&G 0.046 0.062 0.061 3909
AT&T 0.126 0.154 0.147 3818
UTX 0.003 0.003 0.003 2288
Wal-Mart 0.029 0.028 0.028 1914
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Table 7.18: Impulse Responses. Series 2001 Bid.
The table contains the convergence results after a unit impulse was
imparted to the NYSE bid series from 2001. The first column
describes the stock and the next three columns give the value at which
convergence occurred. The last column shows the number of units of
time elapsed for convergence to be achieved.
Unit Impulse to NYSE
Stock Boston Cincinnati NYSE Period
Alcoa 0.629 0.629 0.629 3722
AIG 1.013 1.013 1.013 2813
Am Express 0.817 0.818 0.818 3637
Boeing 1.140 1.140 1.140 2965
BOA 1.191 1.191 1.191 3489
Citigroup 1.019 1.019 1.019 3738
Caterpillar 1.067 1.067 1.068 3794
Chevron 0.974 0.974 0.974 1293
Du Pont 1.193 1.317 1.320 3843
Disney 1.171 1.206 1.219 3661
GE 1.359 1.359 1.359 2167
GM 0.979 0.979 0.979 3023
Home Depot 1.164 1.164 1.164 2226
IBM 1.103 1.103 1.103 1913
J&J 0.906 0.906 0.906 2120
JP Morgan 0.988 0.988 0.988 3451
Coca-Cola 0.971 0.971 0.971 3488
McDonald 0.500 0.508 0.513 3265
3M 1.038 1.038 1.038 2057
Merck 0.727 0.727 0.727 2689
Pfizer 1.038 1.039 1.040 3693
P&G 0.868 0.860 0.860 3697
AT&T 0.106 0.159 0.145 3247
UTX 1.045 1.045 1.045 1749
Wal-Mart 1.132 1.132 1.132 2402
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Table 7.19: Impulse Responses. Series 1999 Offer.
The table contains the convergence results after a unit impulse
was imparted to the Boston offer series 1999. The first column
describes the stock and the next three columns give the value at which
convergence occurred. The last column shows the number of units of
time elapsed for convergence to be achieved.
Unit Impulse to Boston
Stock Boston Cincinnati NYSE Period
Alcoa 0.0611 0.0611 0.0611 1846
AIG 0.0618 0.0618 0.0618 1209
Am Express 0.1514 0.1514 0.1514 1495
Boeing 0.0919 0.0920 0.0920 1842
BOA 0.0634 0.0634 0.0634 1817
Citigroup 0.1238 0.1150 0.1169 2000
Caterpillar 0.1270 0.1281 0.1272 1999
Chevron 0.0047 0.0047 0.0047 1193
Du Pont 0.0440 0.0440 0.0440 1777
Disney 0.0439 0.0439 0.0439 1870
GE 0.0251 0.0251 0.0251 1317
GM 0.2494 0.2507 0.2507 1952
Home Depot 0.0283 0.0218 0.0218 1865
IBM 0.0279 0.0279 0.0280 1168
J&J 0.1015 0.1023 0.1024 1678
JP Morgan 0.0720 0.0720 0.0720 866
Coca-Cola 0.0400 0.0353 0.0345 1486
McDonald 0.0070 0.0064 0.0064 1615
3M 0.1041 0.1041 0.1041 660
Merck 0.0182 0.0183 0.0183 1837
Pfizer 0.1259 0.1259 0.1259 1938
P&G 0.0147 0.0147 0.0147 1311
AT&T 0.0390 0.0390 0.0390 1961
UTX 0.0020 0.0017 0.0016 1793
Wal-Mart 0.0260 0.0261 0.0261 1672
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Table 7.20: Impulse Responses. Series 1999 Offer.
The table contains the convergence results after a unit impulse was
imparted to the Cincinnati offer series from 1999. The first column
describes the stock and the next three columns give the value at which
convergence occurred. The last column shows the number of units of
time elapsed for convergence to be achieved.
Unit Impulse to Cincinnati
Stock Boston Cincinnati NYSE Period
Alcoa 0.0438 0.0438 0.0438 2000
AIG 0.0996 0.0996 0.0996 1216
Am Express 0.3090 0.3090 0.3090 1294
Boeing 0.1336 0.1336 0.1336 1714
BOA 0.0281 0.0281 0.0281 1913
Citigroup 0.1289 0.1208 0.1230 2000
Caterpillar 0.0248 0.0379 0.0276 2000
Chevron 0.1683 0.1683 0.1683 1022
Du Pont 0.0035 0.0035 0.0035 1761
Disney 0.2976 0.2976 0.2976 1894
GE 0.0788 0.0788 0.0788 1285
GM 0.0214 0.0215 0.0215 1959
Home Depot 0.1527 0.1518 0.1518 1892
IBM 0.1001 0.1001 0.1001 1244
J&J 0.0426 0.0426 0.0426 1877
JP Morgan 0.3121 0.3121 0.3121 775
Coca-Cola 0.0710 0.0717 0.0718 1451
McDonald 0.1243 0.1245 0.1245 1653
3M 0.2755 0.2755 0.2755 694
Merck 0.1834 0.1834 0.1834 1755
Pfizer 0.1823 0.1823 0.1823 1804
P&G 0.2018 0.2018 0.2018 1162
AT&T 0.1301 0.1301 0.1301 1878
UTX 0.2297 0.2296 0.2296 1958
Wal-Mart 0.2238 0.2238 0.2238 1676
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Table 7.21: Impulse Responses. Series 1999 Offer.
The table contains the convergence results after a unit impulse was
imparted to the NYSE offer series from 1999. The first column
describes the stock and the next three columns give the value at which
convergence occurred. The last column shows the number of units of
time elapsed for convergence to be achieved.
Unit Impulse to NYSE
Stock Boston Cincinnati NYSE Period
Alcoa 0.7774 0.7774 0.7774 1819
AIG 1.0156 1.0156 1.0156 1039
Am Express 1.0133 1.0133 1.0133 1286
Boeing 0.8273 0.8273 0.8273 1964
BOA 0.8688 0.8688 0.8688 1758
Citigroup 0.9880 0.9868 0.9874 2000
Caterpillar 1.0116 1.0017 1.0095 2000
Chevron 1.0110 1.0110 1.0110 797
Du Pont 1.1240 1.1240 1.1240 1603
Disney 0.6635 0.6635 0.6635 1882
GE 0.9199 0.9199 0.9199 905
GM 1.0250 1.0260 1.0260 1897
Home Depot 0.8300 0.8358 0.8358 1806
IBM 0.9422 0.9422 0.9422 1365
J&J 1.0919 1.0922 1.0922 1796
JP Morgan 0.7784 0.7784 0.7784 639
Coca-Cola 0.9370 0.9386 0.9389 1783
McDonald 0.8835 0.8836 0.8836 1827
3M 1.0725 1.0725 1.0725 631
Merck 0.8525 0.8525 0.8525 1826
Pfizer 0.9648 0.9648 0.9648 1861
P&G 0.8414 0.8414 0.8414 1004
AT&T 1.0920 1.0920 1.0920 1964
UTX 1.2804 1.2805 1.2805 1816
Wal-Mart 0.7940 0.7941 0.7941 1552
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Table 7.22: Impulse Responses. Series 2000 Offer.
The table contains the convergence results after a unit impulse was
imparted to the Boston offer series from 2000. The first column
describes the stock and the next three columns give the value at which
convergence occurred. The last column shows the number of units of
time elapsed for convergence to be achieved.
Unit Impulse to Boston
Stock Boston Cincinnati NYSE Period
Alcoa 0.0178 0.0198 0.0177 1961
AIG 0.0007 0.0020 0.0012 1324
Am Express 0.0469 0.0460 0.0464 1862
Boeing 0.0207 0.0207 0.0207 1517
BOA 0.0033 0.0040 0.0036 1764
Citigroup 0.0109 0.0109 0.0109 1707
Caterpillar 0.1209 0.1086 0.1098 2000
Chevron 0.1740 0.1741 0.1742 1922
Du Pont 0.1600 0.1526 0.1539 1875
Disney 0.2277 0.2045 0.2040 1679
GE 0.0380 0.0383 0.0382 1404
GM 0.0700 0.0690 0.0699 1565
Home Depot 0.0231 0.0230 0.0240 1461
IBM 0.0536 0.0536 0.0536 1404
J&J 0.1678 0.1674 0.1670 1368
JP Morgan 0.2179 0.2179 0.2179 621
Coca-Cola 0.0620 0.0626 0.0630 1766
McDonald 0.0208 0.0188 0.0051 2000
3M 0.0134 0.0140 0.0133 1456
Merck 0.0058 0.0058 0.0057 1194
Pfizer 0.0991 0.0991 0.0991 1543
P&G 0.0657 0.0658 0.0658 1868
AT&T 0.0329 0.0330 0.0330 1514
UTX 0.1936 0.1937 0.1937 1888
Wal-Mart 0.0796 0.0796 0.0797 1643
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Table 7.23: Impulse Responses. Series 2000 Offer.
The table contains the convergence results after a unit impulse was
imparted to the Cincinnati offer series from 2000. The first column
describes the stock and the next three columns give the value at which
convergence occurred. The last column shows the number of units of
time elapsed for convergence to be achieved.
Unit Impulse to Cincinnati
Stock Boston Cincinnati NYSE Period
Alcoa 0.4814 0.4850 0.4788 1996
AIG 0.1760 0.1782 0.1768 1439
Am Express 0.0119 0.0065 0.0094 1339
Boeing 0.0143 0.0143 0.0143 1418
BOA 0.2318 0.2300 0.2311 1948
Citigroup 0.0177 0.0177 0.0177 1595
Caterpillar 0.1186 0.1230 0.1225 2000
Chevron 0.1678 0.1678 0.1677 1745
Du Pont 0.0466 0.0516 0.0507 1420
Disney 0.1300 0.1377 0.1375 1629
GE 0.0180 0.0180 0.0180 1547
GM 0.0666 0.0751 0.0672 1763
Home Depot 0.0035 0.0038 0.0003 1186
IBM 0.0679 0.0679 0.0679 1335
J&J 0.1175 0.1180 0.1174 1501
JP Morgan 0.0905 0.0905 0.0905 800
Coca-Cola 0.0919 0.0918 0.0918 1787
McDonald 0.0782 0.1545 0.1234 2000
3M 0.3201 0.3234 0.3200 1608
Merck 0.0720 0.0721 0.0720 1425
Pfizer 0.1319 0.1319 0.1319 1326
P&G 0.2290 0.2292 0.2293 1647
AT&T 0.0903 0.0903 0.0904 1386
UTX 0.0118 0.0120 0.0119 1573
Wal-Mart 0.0260 0.0265 0.0262 1533
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Table 7.24: Impulse Responses. Series 2000 Offer.
The table contains the convergence results after a unit impulse was
imparted to the NYSE offer series from 2000. The first column
describes the stock and the next three columns give the value at which
convergence occurred. The last column shows the number of units of
time elapsed for convergence to be achieved.
Unit Impulse to NYSE
Stock Boston Cincinnati NYSE Period
Alcoa 0.3662 0.3643 0.3686 1991
AIG 0.9281 0.9258 0.9272 1328
Am Express 0.9976 0.9975 0.9975 1504
Boeing 1.0632 1.0632 1.0632 1474
BOA 1.1978 1.1960 1.1971 1882
Citigroup 1.0909 1.0909 1.0909 1529
Caterpillar 0.7346 0.7441 0.7433 2000
Chevron 0.9630 0.9634 0.9639 1557
Du Pont 0.7710 0.7813 0.7795 1665
Disney 0.6357 0.6442 0.6445 1816
GE 1.0515 1.0516 1.0516 1526
GM 0.9876 0.9790 0.9870 1644
Home Depot 0.9800 0.9800 0.9803 1922
IBM 1.0795 1.0795 1.0795 1449
J&J 0.7994 0.7990 0.7999 1452
JP Morgan 0.9405 0.9405 0.9405 667
Coca-Cola 0.9370 0.9376 0.9381 1731
McDonald 0.7725 0.7190 0.7415 2000
3M 0.6947 0.6900 0.6949 1444
Merck 0.9073 0.9070 0.9074 1340
Pfizer 0.7396 0.7396 0.7396 1525
P&G 0.8687 0.8686 0.8686 1563
AT&T 1.0898 1.0899 1.0899 1427
UTX 1.2411 1.2411 1.2412 1603
Wal-Mart 0.9609 0.9608 0.9609 1895
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Table 7.25: Impulse Responses. Series 2001 Offer.
The table contains the convergence results after a unit impulse was
imparted to the Boston offer series from 2001. The first column
describes the stock and the next three columns give the value at which
convergence occurred. The last column shows the number of units of
time elapsed for convergence to be achieved.
Unit Impulse to Boston
Stock Boston Cincinnati NYSE Period
Alcoa 0.0349 0.0349 0.0349 3736
AIG 0.0730 0.0730 0.0730 3634
Am Express 0.0500 0.0496 0.0496 2756
Boeing 0.0699 0.0699 0.0699 917
BOA 0.0798 0.0798 0.0798 3032
Citigroup 0.1123 0.1123 0.1124 2542
Caterpillar 0.0501 0.0502 0.0503 3708
Chevron 0.2018 0.1996 0.2000 3122
Du Pont 0.0277 0.0265 0.0266 3635
Disney 0.0012 0.0011 0.0010 3523
GE 0.0896 0.0896 0.0896 2574
GM 0.2773 0.2763 0.2760 2515
Home Depot 0.0352 0.0352 0.0352 2576
IBM 0.0674 0.0674 0.0674 1903
J&J 0.0766 0.0763 0.0764 2995
JP Morgan 0.0300 0.0193 0.0198 3749
Coca-Cola 0.0021 0.0022 0.0021 2703
McDonald 0.4836 0.4000 0.3822 3206
3M 0.3100 0.3100 0.3100 1055
Merck 0.0766 0.0766 0.0766 2446
Pfizer 0.0111 0.0111 0.0111 2487
P&G 1.0492 0.0932 0.0601 3051
AT&T 0.0209 0.0337 0.0300 3648
UTX 0.1486 0.1486 0.1486 2330
Wal-Mart 0.0177 0.0178 0.0178 2373
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Table 7.26: Impulse Responses. Series 2001 Offer.
The table contains the convergence results after a unit impulse was
imparted to the Cincinnati offer series from 2001. The first column
describes the stock and the next three columns give the value at which
convergence occurred. The last column shows the number of units of
time elapsed for convergence to be achieved.
Unit Impulse to Cincinnati
Stock Boston Cincinnati NYSE Period
Alcoa 0.0342 0.0342 0.0342 3473
AIG 0.0534 0.0534 0.0534 2553
Am Express 0.0709 0.0710 0.0710 3103
Boeing 0.0160 0.0160 0.0160 967
BOA 0.1084 0.1084 0.1084 2432
Citigroup 0.0482 0.0482 0.0482 3193
Caterpillar 0.1103 0.1103 0.1103 3615
Chevron 0.0740 0.0746 0.0745 3168
Du Pont 0.0713 0.0712 0.0713 3935
Disney 0.0349 0.0349 0.0349 2412
GE 0.1684 0.1684 0.1684 2274
GM 0.0590 0.0589 0.0589 2785
Home Depot 0.0449 0.0449 0.0449 2460
IBM 0.0706 0.0706 0.0706 1814
J&J 0.0659 0.0661 0.0660 2705
JP Morgan 0.0290 0.0272 0.0273 3288
Coca-Cola 0.3073 0.3074 0.3072 2962
McDonald 0.0462 0.0426 0.0420 3230
3M 0.1781 0.1781 0.1781 1127
Merck 0.0723 0.0723 0.0723 2209
Pfizer 0.0080 0.0085 0.0085 2365
P&G 0.1901 0.1031 0.0946 2601
AT&T 0.4000 0.4040 0.4025 3532
UTX 0.2767 0.2768 0.2767 1904
Wal-Mart 0.1924 0.1924 0.1924 2798
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Table 7.27: Impulse Responses. Series 2001 Offer.
The table contains the convergence results after a unit impulse was
imparted to the NYSE offer series from 2001. The first column
describes the stock and the next three columns give the value at which
convergence occurred. The last column shows the number of units of
time elapsed for convergence to be achieved.
Unit Impulse to NYSE
Stock Boston Cincinnati NYSE Period
Alcoa 0.9813 0.9813 0.9813 3689
AIG 1.0335 1.0335 1.0335 3007
Am Express 0.9250 0.9251 0.9251 2774
Boeing 1.1312 1.1312 1.1312 653
BOA 0.8500 0.8501 0.8501 2650
Citigroup 1.0585 1.0585 1.0585 3007
Caterpillar 0.9247 0.9249 0.9249 3589
Chevron 0.8160 0.8171 0.8169 3206
Du Pont 1.1891 1.1901 1.1900 3611
Disney 1.0762 1.0763 1.0763 3166
GE 1.1356 1.1356 1.1356 2913
GM 0.7600 0.7623 0.7630 2040
Home Depot 1.0857 1.0857 1.0857 2490
IBM 0.9582 0.9582 0.9582 1550
J&J 0.8652 0.8662 0.8659 2530
JP Morgan 0.9700 0.9888 0.9879 3333
Coca-Cola 0.6811 0.6800 0.6815 2084
McDonald 0.4317 0.5167 0.5349 3568
3M 0.9411 0.9411 0.9411 918
Merck 1.0348 1.0348 1.0348 2136
Pfizer 0.9558 0.9557 0.9557 2910
P&G 0.4936 0.7988 0.7900 2047
AT&T 0.6160 0.6232 0.6216 3542
UTX 0.6861 0.6860 0.6861 1927
Wal-Mart 0.9158 0.9159 0.9159 1981
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Table 7.28: Information Share Tests. IS Measure - Series Bid
(a) Panel 1: Regulation FD: 1999-2000 IS Bid
The table shows the results of t-tests of differences in information
shares, for the bid series. The estimates are derived with the
Hasbrouck measure, before and after Reg. FD and decimalization
were implemented for the three exchanges. Pre refers to the aggregate
information before the regulation was implemented and Post is the
aggregate information share after the regulation was in force. Panel 1
shows the results of the difference in mean information shares before
and and after Reg. FD was implemented. Panel 2 shows the results
of the same test for the difference between 1999 and 2001, i.e., before
and after both regulations were in force. Panel 3 shows the results of
the t-test before and after decimalization was implemented.
Exchange Mean Difference P-Value Variance
Pre Post Post-Pre P-Value
Boston 0.0808 0.1089 0.02810 0.0276 0.0402
Cincinnati 0.1194 0.0640 -0.05540 <.0001 0.0379
NYSE 0.8160 0.7385 -0.07750 0.0010 0.0003
(b) Panel 2: Regulation FD: 1999-2001 IS Bid
Exchange Mean Difference P-Value Variance
Pre Post Post-Pre P-Value
Boston 0.0808 0.1236 0.04290 0.0049 0.0030
Cincinnati 0.1194 0.0604 -0.05890 <.0001 0.0136
NYSE 0.8160 0.7342 -0.08180 0.0022 <.0001
(c) Panel 3: Decimalization: 2000-2001 IS Bid
Exchange Mean Difference P-Value Variance
Pre Post Post-Pre P-Value
Boston 0.0808 0.1089 0.02810 0.0276 0.0402
Cincinnati 0.1194 0.0640 -0.05540 <.0001 0.0379
NYSE 0.8160 0.7385 -0.07750 0.0010 0.0003
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Table 7.29: Information Share Tests: IS Measure: Series Offer
(a) Panel 1: Regulation FD: 1999-2000 IS Offer
The table shows the results of t-tests of differences in information
shares, for the offer series. The estimates are derived with the
Hasbrouck measure, before and after Reg. FD and decimalization
were implemented for the three exchanges. Pre refers to the aggregate
information before the regulation was implemented and Post is the
aggregate information share after the regulation was in force. Panel 1
shows the results of the difference in mean information shares before
and and after Reg. FD was implemented. Panel 2 shows the results
of the same test for the difference between 1999 and 2001, i.e., before
and after both regulations were in force. Panel 3 shows the results of
the t-test before and after decimalization was implemented.
Exchange Mean Difference P-Value Variance
Pre Post Post-Pre P-Value
Boston 0.0758 0.0986 0.02280 0.0430 0.0216
Cincinnati 0.1186 0.0603 -0.05830 <.0001 0.9170
NYSE 0.8512 0.8303 -0.02090 0.0594 0.1403
(b) Panel 2: Regulation FD: 1999-2001 IS Offer
Exchange Mean Difference P-Value Variance
Pre Post Post-Pre P-Value
Boston 0.0758 0.1334 0.05760 0.0004 0.0001
Cincinnati 0.1186 0.0633 -0.05540 <.0001 0.7475
NYSE 0.8303 0.8166 -0.0137 0.3361 0.0017
(c) Panel 3: Decimalization: 2000-2001 IS Offer
Exchange Mean Difference P-Value Variance
Pre Post Post-Pre P-Value
Boston 0.0986 0.1334 0.03480 0.0382 0.0818
Cincinnati 0.0603 0.0633 0.00296 0.6218 0.8276
NYSE 0.8512 0.8166 -0.03460 0.0276 0.0827
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Table 7.30: Information Share Tests: PT/GG Measure: Series Bid
(a) Regulation FD: 1999-2000 PT/GG Bid
The table shows the results of t-tests of differences in information
shares, for the bid series from Cincinnati and NYSE. The estimates
are derived with the PT/GG measure, before and after Reg. FD
and decimalization were implemented. Pre refers to the aggregate
information before the regulation was implemented and Post is the
aggregate information share after the regulation was in force. Panel A
shows the results of the difference in mean information shares before
and and after Reg. FD was implemented. Panel B shows the results
of the same test for the difference between 2000 and 2001, i.e., before
and after decimalization was in force.
Exchange Mean Difference P-Value Variance
Pre Post Post-Pre P-Value
Cincinnati 0.0315 0.0186 -0.01280 0.6420 <.0001
NYSE 0.9685 0.9814 0.01280 0.6420 <.0001
(b) Decimalization: 2000-2001 PT/GG Bid
Exchange Mean Difference P-Value Variance
Pre Post Post-Pre P-Value
Cincinnati 0.0186 0.0676 0.04900 0.0309 <.0001
NYSE 0.9814 0.9324 -0.04900 0.0309 <.0001
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Table 7.31: Information Share Tests: PT/GG Measure: Series Offer
(a) Regulation FD: 1999-2000 PT/GG Offer
The table shows the results of t-tests of differences in information
shares, for the offer series from Cincinnati and NYSE. The estimates
are derived with the PT/GG measure, before and after Reg. FD
and decimalization were implemented. Pre refers to the aggregate
information before the regulation was implemented and Post is the
aggregate information share after the regulation was in force. Panel A
shows the results of the difference in mean information shares before
and and after Reg. FD was implemented. Panel B shows the results
of the same test for the difference between 2000 and 2001, i.e., before
and after decimalization was in force.
Exchange Mean Difference P-Value Variance
Pre Post Post-Pre P-Value
Cincinnati 0.0057 0.0148 0.00916 0.0620 <.0001
NYSE 0.9943 0.9852 -0.00916 0.0620 <.0001
(b) Decimalization: 2000-2001 PT/GG Offer
Exchange Mean Difference P-Value Variance
Pre Post Post-Pre P-Value
Cincinnati 0.0148 0.0218 0.00692 0.5563 <.0001
NYSE 0.9852 0.9782 -0.00692 0.5563 <.0001
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Table 7.32: Impulse Responses Tests: Series Bid
The table shows the results of t-tests of differences in convergence
times, for the bid series from 1999 and 2000. That is, the period before
and after Reg. FD was implemented. Pre refers to the aggregate
convergence time before the regulation was implemented and Post is
the aggregate after the regulation was in force.
Reg. FD: 1999-2000 IS Bid
Exchange Mean Difference P-Value Variance
Pre Post Post - Pre P-Value
Boston 1522.00 1603.00 81.00 0.4413 0.4558
Cincinnati 1540.10 1652.60 112.50 0.3032 0.3785
NYSE 1438.00 1635.60 197.60 0.1026 0.2289
Table 7.33: Impulse Responses Tests: Series Offer
The table shows the results of t-tests of differences in convergence
times, for the bid series from 1999 and 2000. That is, the period before
and after Reg. FD was implemented. Pre refers to the aggregate
convergence time before the regulation was implemented and Post is
the aggregate after the regulation was in force.
Reg. FD: 1999-2000 IS Offer
Exchange Mean Difference P-Value Variance
Pre Post Post - Pre P-Value
Boston 1606.70 1612.20 5.56 0.9542 0.4115
Cincinnati 1540.10 1557.80 17.72 0.8600 0.0540
NYSE 1552.80 1597.40 44.56 0.6797 0.0290
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Table 7.34: Impulse Responses Tests: Series Bid
The table shows the results of t-tests of differences in convergence
times, for the bid series from 2000 and 2001. That is, the period
before and after decimalization was implemented. Pre refers to the
aggregate convergence time before the regulation was implemented
and Post is the aggregate after the regulation was in force.
Decimalization: 2000-2001 IS Bid
Exchange Mean Difference P-Value Variance
Pre Post Post - Pre P-Value
Boston 1603.00 3061.30 1458.20 <.0001 0.0003
Cincinnati 1652.60 2852.50 1199.80 <.0001 0.0003
NYSE 1635.60 2965.70 1330.10 <.0001 0.0006
Table 7.35: Impulse Responses Tests: Series Offer
The table shows the results of t-tests of differences in convergence
times, for the offer series from 2000 and 2001. That is, the period
before and after decimalization was implemented. Pre refers to the
aggregate convergence time before the regulation was implemented
and Post is the aggregate after the regulation was in force.
Decimalization: 2000-2001 IS Offer
Exchange Mean Difference P-Value Variance
Pre Post Post - Pre P-Value
Boston 1612.20 2808.60 1196.40 <.0001 <.0001
Cincinnati 1557.80 2676.20 1118.40 <.0001 <.0001
NYSE 1597.40 2612.80 1015.50 <.0001 <.0001
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Table 7.36: Impulse Responses Tests
The table shows the results of t-tests of differences in convergence
times between the bid and offer series from 1999. That is, the period
before both Reg. FD and decimalization were implemented. Pre
refers to the aggregate convergence time before the regulation was
implemented and Post is the aggregate after the regulation was in
force.
1999 Bid vs. Offer
Exchange Mean Difference P-Value Variance
Pre Post Post - Pre P-Value
Boston 1522.00 1606.70 84.64 0.4375 0.7201
Cincinnati 1540.10 1595.10 54.96 0.6347 0.8311
NYSE 1438.00 1552.80 114.80 0.3826 0.8688
Table 7.37: Impulse Responses Tests
The table shows the results of t-tests of differences in convergence
times between the bid and offer series from 2000. That is, the
period when Reg. FD was implemented, but not decimalization. Pre
refers to the aggregate convergence time before the regulation was
implemented and Post is the aggregate after the regulation was in
force.
2000 Bid vs. Offer
Exchange Mean Difference P-Value Variance
Pre Post Post - Pre P-Value
Boston 1603.00 1612.20 -9.20 0.9208 0.6641
Cincinnati 1652.60 1557.80 94.80 0.2907 0.2869
NYSE 1635.60 1597.40 38.24 0.6821 0.2420
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Table 7.38: Impulse Responses Tests
The table shows the results of t-tests of differences in convergence
times between the bid and offer series from 2001. That is, the period
when decimalization was implemented. Pre refers to the aggregate
convergence time before the regulation was implemented, and Post is
the aggregate after the regulation was in force.
2001 Bid vs. Offer
Exchange Mean Difference P-Value Variance
Pre Post Post - Pre P-Value
Boston 3061.30 2808.60 252.60 0.2391 0.8669
Cincinnati 2852.50 2676.20 176.30 0.4031 0.8678
NYSE 2965.70 2612.80 352.80 0.1246 0.7078
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Table A.1: Unit Root Tests. Data Series - Quotes on NYSE, Cincinnati, Boston from
Oct 30 - Dec 24 1999.
The table shows the results of the ADF test for the presence of a unit root. The series are from
Boston, Cincinnati and NYSE for 1999 when neither regulation was in force.
Null Hypothesis: Series contains a unit root
Stock Boston Cincinnati NYSE
Statistic P-Value Statistic P-Value Statistic P-Value
Alcoa 0.6430 0.8551 0.6876 0.8641 -0.8560 0.8023
AIG 0.2337 0.7541 0.2440 0.7570 0.2420 0.7565
Am Express 0.1581 0.7320 0.1553 0.7312 0.1566 0.7316
Boeing -2.2396 0.1924 -2.1124 0.2399 -2.1579 0.2222
BOA -1.4460 0.5609 -1.3881 0.5896 -1.3960 0.5857
Citigroup 0.1598 0.7325 0.1986 0.7440 0.4794 0.8185
Caterpillar -1.5029 0.5322 -1.4718 0.5480 -1.5059 0.5306
Chevron -0.5131 0.4945 -0.5157 0.4935 -0.5245 0.4898
Du Pont -0.0876 0.6535 -0.0933 0.6516 -0.1062 0.6471
Disney 0.1209 0.7206 0.1463 0.7283 0.1301 0.7234
General Electric 0.2057 0.7461 0.2925 0.7705 0.2862 0.7688
General Motors 0.1575 0.7318 0.1686 0.7351 0.1686 0.7351
Home Depot 0.2156 0.7489 0.2273 0.7522 0.2281 0.7525
IBM 0.1349 0.7251 0.1494 0.7294 0.1485 0.7292
J&J -1.8876 0.3385 -2.1584 0.2219 -1.8958 0.3346
JP Morgan 0.0635 0.7030 0.0731 0.7060 0.0757 0.7068
Coca-Cola 0.0839 0.7089 0.0829 0.7086 0.0834 0.7087
McDonald -2.4131 0.1382 -2.3875 0.1454 -2.4032 0.1410
3M -2.0537 0.2639 -2.0408 0.2694 -2.0823 0.2520
Merck -0.6480 0.4368 -0.6600 0.4315 -0.6536 0.4343
Pfizer -2.4752 0.1217 -2.4579 0.1262 -2.3243 0.1644
P&G -2.2978 0.1728 -2.2781 0.1793 -2.2852 0.1770
AT&T 0.2588 0.7611 0.2586 0.7610 0.2486 0.7582
UTX 0.1070 0.7165 0.1527 0.7304 0.1325 0.7243
Wal-Mart 0.2646 0.7628 0.2920 0.7703 0.2837 0.7681
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Table A.2: Unit Root Tests. Data Series - Quotes on NYSE, Cincinnati, Boston from
Oct 30 - Dec 24 2000.
The table shows the results of the ADF test for the presence of a unit root. The series are from
Boston, Cincinnati and NYSE for 2000 when Reg. FD was in force.
Null Hypothesis: Series contains a unit root
Stock Boston Cincinnati NYSE
Statistic P-Value Statistic P-Value Statistic P-Value
Statistic P-Value Statistic P-Value Statistic P-Value
Alcoa 0.3959 0.7977 0.4340 0.8073 0.4244 0.8050
AIG -0.2209 0.6069 -0.2293 0.6038 -0.2209 0.6068
Am Express -0.4368 0.5255 -0.4148 0.5341 -0.4290 0.5286
Boeing -0.1085 0.6463 -0.0608 0.6625 -0.0867 0.6538
BOA -0.1400 0.6351 -0.1226 0.6411 -0.1360 0.6365
Citigroup -0.2785 0.5859 -0.3239 0.5690 -0.3140 0.5727
Caterpillar 0.8260 0.8896 0.8456 0.8930 0.8417 0.8923
Chevron -0.2479 0.5970 -0.2640 0.5912 -0.2519 0.5956
Du Pont 0.2142 0.7484 0.2264 0.7519 0.2177 0.7494
Disney -0.7478 0.3925 -0.7674 0.3838 -0.7525 0.3904
General Electric -0.4325 0.5271 -0.4155 0.5338 -0.4060 0.5375
General Motors -0.5642 0.4730 -0.5556 0.4766 -0.5513 0.4784
Home Depot -0.1021 0.6484 -0.0979 0.6498 -0.0965 0.6503
IBM -0.1852 0.6196 -0.1634 0.6273 -0.1764 0.6227
J&J 0.3062 0.7742 0.3171 0.7772 0.2928 0.7706
JP Morgan 0.0459 0.6975 0.0563 0.7008 0.0477 0.6980
Coca-Cola -0.0339 0.6707 -0.0319 0.6714 -0.0561 0.6633
McDonald 0.2667 0.7631 0.2471 0.7576 0.2616 0.7617
3M 0.3366 0.7824 0.3608 0.7888 0.3423 0.7840
Merck 0.0552 0.7004 0.0815 0.7086 0.0628 0.7028
Pfizer -0.0008 0.6823 0.0115 0.6863 -0.0193 0.6762
P&G -0.1548 0.6303 -0.1685 0.6255 -0.1574 0.6294
AT&T -1.0213 0.2763 -1.0277 0.2738 -1.0245 0.2751
UTX 0.3314 0.7810 0.3622 0.7892 0.3450 0.7847
Wal-Mart -0.0339 0.6714 -0.0332 0.6717 -0.0361 0.6707
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Table A.3: Unit Root Tests. Data Series - Quotes on NYSE, Cincinnati, Boston from
March 30 - May 30 2001.
The table shows the results of the ADF test for the presence of a unit root. The series are from
Boston, Cincinnati and NYSE for 2001 when decimalization was implemented.
Null Hypothesis: Series contains a unit root
Stock Boston Cincinnati NYSE
Statistic P-Value Statistic P-Value Statistic P-Value
Statistic P-Value Statistic P-Value Statistic P-Value
Alcoa -0.0427 0.6684 -0.0502 0.6659 -0.0514 0.6655
AIG -0.5497 0.4791 -0.5462 0.4806 -0.5474 0.4801
Am Express -0.5229 0.4904 -0.6750 0.4249 -0.5301 0.4874
Boeing -0.4108 0.5357 -0.4061 0.5375 -0.4025 0.5390
BOA 0.2217 0.7506 0.2190 0.7498 0.2166 0.7491
Citigroup -0.8325 0.3555 -0.9671 0.2985 -0.9403 0.3095
Caterpillar -0.2855 0.5833 -0.2986 0.5784 -0.2937 0.5802
Chevron -0.2337 0.6023 -0.2397 0.6001 -0.2156 0.6088
Du Pont -0.8738 0.3376 -0.9285 0.3144 -0.9383 0.3103
Disney -0.8082 0.3660 -0.8123 0.3642 -0.7347 0.3984
General Electric -1.9042 0.0543 -2.0869 0.0355 -1.9944 0.0442
General Motors -0.4284 0.5288 -0.4701 0.5121 -0.4694 0.5124
Home Depot -0.0249 0.6744 -0.0668 0.6604 -0.0443 0.6680
IBM -0.7091 0.4098 -0.7222 0.4040 -0.6996 0.4140
J&J 0.0678 0.7043 0.1015 0.7148 0.0830 0.7090
JP Morgan -1.1192 0.2395 -1.0853 0.2520 -1.0430 0.2682
Coca-Cola 0.4311 0.8064 0.5059 0.8245 0.4388 0.8083
McDonald 0.1542 0.7306 0.2064 0.7460 0.1540 0.7306
3M -0.3696 0.5517 -0.3737 0.5501 -0.3700 0.5515
Merck -0.0602 0.6627 -0.0581 0.6634 -0.0701 0.6594
Pfizer -0.4197 0.5321 -0.4738 0.5105 -0.4543 0.5184
P&G 2.0689 0.9913 2.3877 0.9963 2.3008 0.9953
AT&T -0.3757 0.5489 -0.3847 0.5454 -0.3794 0.5474
UTX -0.2385 0.6005 -0.2129 0.6097 -0.2214 0.6066
Wal-Mart -0.1013 0.6487 -0.0793 0.6562 -0.0842 0.6546
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Table A.4: Granger Causality Tests - Series Bid 1999.
The table shows the results of the Granger Causality test. The test is conducted between pairs of
series. BBID, CBID and NBID refer to the 1999 bid series from Boston, Cincinnati and NYSE
respectively. Column two states the null hypothesis of the test, and the next two columns show
the test static and the p-value
Stock Null Hypothesis F-Stat P-Value
Alcoa CBID does not Granger-Cause BBID 9.0849 0.0001
AIG NBID does not Granger-Cause BBID 75.0947 0.0000
Am Express BBID does not Granger-Cause NBID 6.1813 0.0021
Boeing NBID does not Granger-Cause BBID 84.2424 0.0000
BOA CBID does not Granger-Cause BBID 34.8066 0.0000
Citigroup BBID does not Granger-Cause CBID 4.4161 0.0005
Caterpillar NBID does not Granger-Cause CBID 23.2863 0.0000
Chevron BBID does not Granger-Cause NBID 2.6614 0.0699
Du Pont CBID does not Granger-Cause BBID 119.6440 0.0000
Disney CBID does not Granger-Cause BBID 16.8301 0.0000
GE NBID does not Granger-Cause BBID 2725.8600 0.0000
GM BBID does not Granger-Cause CBID 4.9142 0.0074
Home Depot CBID does not Granger-Cause BBID 22.1290 0.0000
IBM NBID does not Granger-Cause BBID 211.7290 0.0000
J&J BBID does not Granger-Cause CBID 5.8964 0.0028
JP Morgan CBID does not Granger-Cause BBID 71.9411 0.0000
Coca-Cola NBID does not Granger-Cause BBID 3.6452 0.0269
McDonald BBID does not Granger-Cause CBID 2.5560 0.0779
3M NBID does not Granger-Cause CBID 128.3400 0.0000
Merck BBID does not Granger-Cause CBID 7.7728 0.0004
Pfizer CBID does not Granger-Cause BBID 15.8679 0.0000
P&G BBID does not Granger-Cause CBID 60.6626 0.0000
AT&T NBID does not Granger-Cause BBID 26.4096 0.0000
UTX CBID does not Granger-Cause BBID 36.7996 0.0000
Wal-Mart NBID does not Granger-Cause CBID 14.6349 0.0000
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Table A.5: Granger Causality Tests - Series Offer 2000.
The table shows the results of the Granger Causality test. The test is conducted between pairs
of series. BBID, CBID and NBID refer to the 2000 offer series from Boston, Cincinnati and
NYSE respectively. Column two states the null hypothesis of the test, and the next two columns
show the test static and the p-value
Stock Null Hypothesis F-Stat P-Value
Alcoa COFR does not Granger-Cause BOFR 12.6050 0.0000
AIG NOFR does not Granger-Cause COFR 114.6160 0.0000
Am Express BOFR does not Granger-Cause COFR 19.4151 0.0000
Boeing NOFR does not Granger-Cause COFR 93.5992 0.0000
BOA COFR does not Granger-Cause BOFR 5.7504 0.0034
Citigroup BOFR does not Granger-Cause COFR 114.6340 0.0000
Caterpillar NOFR does not Granger-Cause COFR 5.7925 0.0032
Chevron BOFR does not Granger-Cause NOFR 3.0572 0.0472
Du Pont COFR does not Granger-Cause BOFR 29.3071 0.0000
Disney NOFR does not Granger-Cause BOFR 10.1171 0.0001
GE BOFR does not Granger-Cause COFR 18.0139 0.0000
GM COFR does not Granger-Cause BOFR 6.9630 0.0010
Home Depot NOFR does not Granger-Cause BOFR 39.4260 0.0000
IBM BOFR does not Granger-Cause COFR 279.6360 0.0000
J&J COFR does not Granger-Cause BOFR 34.8058 0.0000
JP Morgan BOFR does not Granger-Cause COFR 135.9700 0.0000
Coca-Cola NOFR does not Granger-Cause COFR 3.0114 0.0508
McDonald BOFR does not Granger-Cause COFR 17.8107 0.0000
3M COFR does not Granger-Cause BOFR 11.1634 0.0000
Merck BOFR does not Granger-Cause NOFR 3.0567 0.0472
Pfizer NOFR does not Granger-Cause BOFR 125.7630 0.0000
P&G BOFR does not Granger-Cause COFR 28.2957 0.0000
AT&T COFR does not Granger-Cause BOFR 5.6463 0.0038
UTX NOFR does not Granger-Cause BOFR 9.1539 0.0001
Wal-Mart COFR does not Granger-Cause BOFR 25.3244 0.0000
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Table A.6: Granger Causality Tests - Series Bid 2001.
The table shows the results of the Granger Causality test. The test is conducted between pairs of
series. BBID, CBID and NBID refer to the 2001 bid series from Boston, Cincinnati and NYSE
respectively. Column two states the null hypothesis of the test, and the next two columns show
the test static and the p-value
Stock Null Hypothesis F-Stat P-Value
Alcoa NBID does not Granger-Cause CBID 37.6514 1.00E-16
AIG CBID does not Granger-Cause BBID 5.97793 0.0026
Am Express BBID does not Granger-Cause CBID 143.694 6.00E-61
Boeing CBID does not Granger-Cause BBID 79.5763 1.00E-34
BOA NBID does not Granger-Cause BBID 83.7697 8.00E-36
Citigroup BBID does not Granger-Cause CBID 80.4339 6.00E-35
Caterpillar NBID does not Granger-Cause BBID 44.7827 8.00E-20
Chevron CBID does not Granger-Cause BBID 28.9289 3.00E-13
Du Pont BBID does not Granger-Cause CBID 18.227 1.00E-08
Disney NBID does not Granger-Cause BBID 102.484 1.00E-42
GE CBID does not Granger-Cause BBID 243.142 1.00E-100
GM BBID does not Granger-Cause CBID 15.0193 3.00E-07
Home Depot NBID does not Granger-Cause BBID 188.347 1.00E-75
IBM BBID does not Granger-Cause CBID 29.9239 1.00E-13
J&J CBID does not Granger-Cause BBID 47.5919 6.00E-21
JP Morgan NBID does not Granger-Cause BBID 82.3935 5.00E-35
Coca-Cola CBID does not Granger-Cause BBID 68.6566 8.00E-27
McDonald BBID does not Granger-Cause NBID 2.84799 0.0585
3M CBID does not Granger-Cause BBID 2.14496 1.17E-01
Merck NBID does not Granger-Cause CBID 82.3363 1.00E-35
Pfizer BBID does not Granger-Cause NBID 4.46092 0.0117
P&G CBID does not Granger-Cause BBID 34.1253 2.00E-15
AT&T NBID does not Granger-Cause CBID 3.92241 0.0204
UTX NBID does not Granger-Cause CBID 7.18535 8.00E-04
Wal-Mart BBID does not Granger-Cause CBID 3.20812 0.0406
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A.1 Figures
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e) (f)
Figure A.1: Impulse Response Functions: Series 1999
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e) (f)
Figure A.2: Impulse Response Functions: Series 2000
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e) (f)
Figure A.3: Impulse Response Functions: Series 2001
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APPENDIX B
Granger Representation Theorem
B.1 Definitions
Let Xt = (x1, x2, . . . , xk)
′
be a k component vector of I(d) variables i.e., Xt ∼ I(d)
If the components of Xt are cointegrated then there exists a vector β such that β
′
Xt ∼
I(d− b) where d ≥ b > 0 and β is a cointegrating vector.
If Xt is a (kx1) with k > 2 then there can be more than one cointegrating vector and β is
a (nxr) matrix whose columns are cointegrating vectors. Cointegrating rank rk(β) = r ≤
(k − 1).
A time series vector Yt has an error correcting representation if it can be expressed as
A(L)(1− L)Yt = −αzt−1 + et (B.1)
where et is stationary, L is the lag operator, A(0) = In. zt = β
′
Yt and α is a vector of
adjustment coefficients.
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B.2 Granger Representation Theorem
The following proof is from Banerjee et al. (?): Let Xt = (x1, x2, . . . , xn)
′ be an n-variate
vector of I(1) variables and if it can be written as a VAR
Xt = µ+
k∑
i=1
piiXt−i + εt (B.2)
and the terms X0, . . . , X(k − 1) are fixed, then there is an Error Correction Representation
∆Xt = µ+ ΠX(t− 1) +
k−1∑
i=1
Γi(1− L)LiXt + εt (B.3)
or,
Π(L)Xt = µ+ εt, fort = 1, 2, . . . , T (B.4)
Where: Π(L) = (1 − L)In −
k−1∑
i=1
Γi(1 − L)Li − ΠLk Γi = −In + pi1 + pi2 + . . . + pii for
i = 1, 2, . . . , k, Γk = Π = −Π(1)
Equation B.3 can be written as
Π(L)Xt = −ΠXt−k + Ψ(L)∆Xt = µ+ εt (B.5)
where Ψ(L) = (1− L)−1
(
Π(L)− Π(1)Lk
)
= In −
k−1∑
i=1
ΓiL
i
B.2.1 Assumptions
A1. The characteristic polynomial: Π(z) = (1− z)In −
k−1∑
i=1
Γi(1− z)zi −Πzk has roots
outside or on the unit circle, i.e., z ≥ 1.
A2. rk(Π) = r < n therefore it can be expressed as the product of two nxr matrices α
and β which both have rank r. Therefore Π = αβ ′ .
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A3. The (n− r)x(n− r) matrix α′⊥Ψβ⊥ has full rank (n− r).
The Error Correction Representation has the following properties:
P1. ∆Xt is stationary.
P2. β ′Xt is stationary.
P3. E [∆Xt] = β⊥
(
α
′
⊥Ψβ⊥
)−1
α
′
⊥µ
P4. E
[
β
′
Xt
]
= −(α′α)−1α′µ+ (α′α)−1
(
α
′
⊥Ψβ⊥
) (
α
′
⊥Ψβ⊥
)−1
α
′
⊥µ
P5. ∆Xt has finite MA representation ∆Xt = C(L)(µ+ εt)
P6. C(1) = β⊥
(
α
′
⊥Ψβ⊥
)−1
α
′
⊥ with rank (n− r).
P7. β ′C(1) = 0(rxn) and C(1)α = 0(nxr).
P8. Xt = X0 + Ψ(1)
t∑
i=1
εt + τt+ St where C(L) = C(1) + (1−L)C∗(L), τ = C(1)µ,
St = C
∗(L)εt
B.2.2 Proof:
To prove P1 & P2, i.e., ∆Xt and β
′
Xt, are stationary, multiply Equation B.5 by α
′ and α′⊥
using Π = αβ ′ and α′⊥α = 0 we get
α
′
αβ
′
Xt + α
′
Ψ(L)∆Xt = α
′
(µ+ εt) (B.6)
α
′
⊥Ψ(L)∆Xt = α
′
⊥(µ+ εt) (B.7)
This system is not invertible since pi is not invertible. Define ωt = (β
′
β)−1β
′
Xt and
υt = (β
′
⊥β⊥)
−1β
′
⊥∆Xt, let β = β(β
′
β)−1, β⊥ = (β
′
⊥β⊥)
−1β
′
⊥ if R = (β, β⊥) then
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R(R
′
R)−1R
′
= In, therefore
(
ββ + β⊥β
′
⊥
)
= In. ∆Xt =
(
ββ + β⊥β
′
⊥
)
∆Xt =
β∆ωt + β⊥υt substituting in B.6 and B.7, we get
−(α′α)(β ′β)ωt + α′Ψ(L)β∆ωt + α′Ψ(L)β⊥υt = α′(µ+ εt) (B.8)
α
′
⊥Ψ(L)β∆ωt + α
′
⊥Ψ(L)β⊥υt = α
′
⊥(µ+ εt) (B.9)
Equations for ωt and υt can be written in AR as A˜(L)(ω
′
tυ
′
t)
′
= (α, α⊥)
′
(µ + εt) and the
characteristic polynomial is:
A˜(z) =
 −(α
′
α)(β
′
β)ωt + α
′
Ψ(z)β(1− z) α′Ψ(z)β⊥
α
′
⊥Ψ(z)β(1− z) α′⊥Ψ(z)β⊥
 (B.10)
∣∣∣A˜(z)∣∣∣ = (−1)r ∣∣∣α′α∣∣∣ ∣∣∣β ′β∣∣∣ ∣∣∣α′⊥Ψβ⊥∣∣∣ 6= 0 by A2 and A3 or z = 1 is not a root, for z 6= 1.
A˜(z) = (α, α⊥)
′
Π(z)
[
β, β⊥(1− z)−1
]
(B.11)
and ∣∣∣A˜(z)∣∣∣ = |α, α⊥| |Π(z)| |β, β⊥| (1− z)−(n−r) (B.12)
For z 6= 1,
∣∣∣A˜(z)∣∣∣ = 0 iff |Π(z)| = 0. Consequently, all the roots of A˜(z) are outside
the unit circle. Since ∆Xt = β∆ωt + β⊥υt, stationarity of ωt and υt ensures that ∆Xt is
stationary. Since β ′Xt = (β
′
β)ωt, β
′
Xt is also stationary. P3 and P4 are proved as follows:
(ω
′
tυ
′
t)
′
= A˜(L)
−1
(α, α⊥)
′
(µ+ εt) (B.13)
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Therefore E
[
(ω
′
tυ
′
t)
′]
= A˜(1)
−1
(α, α⊥)
′
µ
A˜(1) =
 −(α
′
α)(β
′
β) α
′
Ψ(1)β⊥
0 α
′
⊥Ψ(1)β⊥
 (B.14)
on inverting the matrix:
A˜(1)
−1
=
 −(β
′
β)−1(α
′
α)−1 (β
′
β)−1(α
′
α)−1α
′
Ψ(1)β⊥(α
′
⊥Ψ(1)β⊥)
−1
0 α
′
⊥Ψ(1)β⊥
 (B.15)
E [ωt] = −(β ′β)−1(α′α)−1α′µ+(β ′β)−1(α′α)−1α′Ψ(1)βP⊥(α′⊥Ψ(1)β⊥)−1α
′
⊥µ (B.16)
E [υt] = (α
′
⊥Ψ(1)β⊥)
−1α
′
⊥µ (B.17)
from Equations B.16 and B.17, we obtainE [∆Xt] = β⊥E [υt]+βE [∆ωt] sinceE [∆ωt] =
0.
E [∆Xt] = β⊥(α
′
⊥Ψ(1)β⊥)
−1α
′
⊥µ : P3 is proved (B.18)
E
[
β
′
Xt
]
= E
[
(β
′
β)ωt
]
= (β
′
β)E [ωt] = (B.19)
− (α′α)−1α′µ+ (α′α)−1
(
α
′
⊥Ψβ⊥
) (
α
′
⊥Ψβ⊥
)−1
α
′
⊥µ : P4 is proved
We have
(ω
′
t
υ
′
t)
′
=
[
A˜(L)
]−1 [
(α, α⊥)
′
(µ+ εt)
]
.
However,
∆Xt = α∆ωt + β⊥υt (B.20)
= [β(1− L), β⊥] (ω′t, υ
′
t)
′
= [β(1− L), β⊥]
[
A˜(L)
]−1 [
(α, α⊥)
′
(µ+ εt)
]
= C(L)(µ+ εt)
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where C(L) = [β(1− L), β⊥]
[
A˜(L)
]−1
(α, α⊥)
′ . This proves P5
We have, C(1) = [0, β⊥]
[
A˜(L)
]−1
(α, α
′
⊥).
Since β(1− L) = 0 at L = 1, substituting for
[
A˜(1)
]−1
,
C(1) = β⊥(α
′
⊥Ψ(1)β⊥)
−1α
′
⊥ (B.21)
we know β⊥, α
′
⊥ and (α
′
⊥Ψ(1)β⊥)
−1 have rank (n− r), so rk(C(1)) = (n− r).
This proves P6 and P7
Writing C(L) = C(1) + (1− L)C∗(L) from P5,
∆Xt = C(1)µ+ C(1)εt + (1− L)C∗(L)µ+ (1− L)C∗(L)εt (B.22)
= C(1)µ+ C(1)εt + (1− L)C∗(L)εt
By backward substitution we obtain
Xt = X0 + C(1)
t∑
i=1
εi + C(1)µt+ St P8 is proved (B.23)
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APPENDIX C
Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading
C.1 SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
17 CFR Parts 240, 243, and 249
Release Nos. 33-7881, 34-43154, IC-24599, File No. S7-31-99
RIN 3235-AH82
Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading
AGENCY: Securities and Exchange Commission.
ACTION: Final rule.
SUMMARY: The Securities and Exchange Commission is adopting new rules to address
three issues: the selective disclosure by issuers of material nonpublic information; when
insider trading liability arises in connection with a trader’s “use” or “knowing possession”
of material nonpublic information; and when the breach of a family or other non-business
relationship may give rise to liability under the misappropriation theory of insider trading.
The rules are designed to promote the full and fair disclosure of information by issuers,
and to clarify and enhance existing prohibitions against insider trading.
EFFECTIVE DATE: The new rules and amendments will take effect October 23, 2000.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Richard A. Levine, Sharon Zamore, or Jacob Lesser
Office of the General Counsel
Phone: (202)942-0890
123
Amy Starr
Office of Chief Counsel, Division of Corporation Finance
Phone: (202) 942-2900.
C.2 SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
The Securities and Exchange Commission today is adopting new rules: Regulation FD1,
Rule 10b5-12, and Rule 10b5-23. Additionally, the Commission is adopting amendments
to Form 8-K4.
C.2.1 I. Executive Summary
We are adopting new rules and amendments to address the selective disclosure of material
nonpublic information by issuers and to clarify two issues under the law of insider
trading. In response to the comments we received on the proposal, we have made several
modifications, as discussed below, in the final rules.
Regulation FD (Fair Disclosure) is a new issuer disclosure rule that addresses selective
disclosure. The regulation provides that when an issuer, or person acting on its behalf,
discloses material nonpublic information to certain enumerated persons (in general,
securities market professionals and holders of the issuer’s securities who may well trade
on the basis of the information), it must make public disclosure of that information. The
timing of the required public disclosure depends on whether the selective disclosure was
intentional or non-intentional; for an intentional selective disclosure, the issuer must make
public disclosure simultaneously; for a non-intentional disclosure, the issuer must make
1http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-7881.htm#P12 1307
2http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-7881.htm#P13 1345
3http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-7881.htm#P14 1382
4http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-7881.htm#P15 1468
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public disclosure promptly. Under the regulation, the required public disclosure may be
made by filing or furnishing a Form 8-K, or by another method or combination of methods
that is reasonably designed to effect broad, non-exclusionary distribution of the information
to the public.
Rule 10b5-1 addresses the issue of when insider trading liability arises in connection with
a trader’s “use” or “knowing possession” of material nonpublic information. This rule
provides that a person trades “on the basis of” material nonpublic information when the
person purchases or sells securities while aware of the information. However, the rule also
sets forth several affirmative defenses, which we have modified in response to comments,
to permit persons to trade in certain circumstances where it is clear that the information
was not a factor in the decision to trade. Rule 10b5-2 addresses the issue of when a
breach of a family or other non-business relationship may give rise to liability under the
misappropriation theory of insider trading. The rule sets forth three non-exclusive bases for
determining that a duty of trust or confidence was owed by a person receiving information,
and will provide greater certainty and clarity on this unsettled issue.
C.2.2 II. Selective Disclosure: Regulation FD
A. Background
As discussed in the Proposing Release5, we have become increasingly concerned about the
selective disclosure of material information by issuers. As reflected in recent publicized
reports, many issuers are disclosing important nonpublic information, such as advance
warnings of earnings results, to securities analysts or selected institutional investors or
both, before making full disclosure of the same information to the general public. Where
this has happened, those who were privy to the information beforehand were able to make
a profit or avoid a loss at the expense of those kept in the dark.
5http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-7881.htm#P22 3881
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We believe that the practice of selective disclosure leads to a loss of investor confidence in
the integrity of our capital markets. Investors who see a security’s price change dramatically
and only later are given access to the information responsible for that move rightly question
whether they are on a level playing field with market insiders.
Issuer selective disclosure bears a close resemblance in this regard to ordinary “tipping” and
insider trading. In both cases, a privileged few gain an informational edge – and the ability
to use that edge to profit – from their superior access to corporate insiders, rather than from
their skill, acumen, or diligence. Likewise, selective disclosure has an adverse impact on
market integrity that is similar to the adverse impact from illegal insider trading: investors
lose confidence in the fairness of the markets when they know that other participants may
exploit “unerodable informational advantages” derived not from hard work or insights,
but from their access to corporate insiders6. The economic effects of the two practices
are essentially the same. Yet, as a result of judicial interpretations, tipping and insider
trading can be severely punished under the antifraud provisions of the federal securities
laws, whereas the status of issuer selective disclosure has been considerably less clear.7
Regulation FD is also designed to address another threat to the integrity of our markets:
the potential for corporate management to treat material information as a commodity to
be used to gain or maintain favor with particular analysts or investors. As noted in the
Proposing Release, in the absence of a prohibition on selective disclosure, analysts may
feel pressured to report favorably about a company or otherwise slant their analysis in
order to have continued access to selectively disclosed information. We are concerned, in
this regard, with reports that analysts who publish negative views of an issuer are sometimes
excluded by that issuer from calls and meetings to which other analysts are invited8.
Finally, as we also observed in the Proposing Release, technological developments have
6http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-7881.htm#P25 5597
7http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-7881.htm#P26 6448
8http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-7881.htm#P28 7865
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made it much easier for issuers to disseminate information broadly. Whereas issuers once
may have had to rely on analysts to serve as information intermediaries, issuers now can
use a variety of methods to communicate directly with the market. In addition to press
releases, these methods include, among others, Internet webcasting and teleconferencing.
Accordingly, technological limitations no longer provide an excuse for abiding the threats
to market integrity that selective disclosure represents.
To address the problem of selective disclosure, we proposed Regulation FD. It targets the
practice by establishing new requirements for full and fair disclosure by public companies.
Source: http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-7881.htm#P12 1307
Rule 100 – General Rule Regarding Selective Disclosure
Whenever an issuer, or any person acting on its behalf, discloses any material nonpublic
information regarding that issuer or its securities to any person described in paragraph
(b)(1) of this section, the issuer shall make public disclosure of that information as provided
in Rule 101(e)9.
Simultaneously, in the case of an intentional disclosure; and Promptly, in the case of a non-
intentional disclosure. Except as provided in paragraph (b)(2) of this section, paragraph (a)
of this section shall apply to a disclosure made to any person outside the issuer:
Who is a broker or dealer, or a person associated with a broker or dealer, as those terms are
defined in Section 3(a)10 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
Who is an investment adviser, as that term is defined in Section 202(a)(11)11 of the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940; an institutional investment manager, as that term is
defined in Section 13(f)(5)12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, that filed a report
on Form 13F with the Commission for the most recent quarter ended prior to the date
9http://www.law.uc.edu/CCL/regFD/FD101.html#e
10http://www.law.uc.edu/CCL/34Act/sec3.html#a
11http://www.law.uc.edu/CCL/InvAdvAct/sec202.html
12http://www.law.uc.edu/CCL/34Act/sec13.html#f.5
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of the disclosure; or a person associated with either of the foregoing. For purposes of
this paragraph, a “person associated with an investment adviser or institutional investment
manager” has the meaning set forth in Section 202(a)(17) of the Investment Advisers Act of
1940, assuming for these purposes that an institutional investment manager is an investment
adviser;
Who is an investment company, as defined in Section 313 of the Investment Company Act
of 1940, or who would be an investment company but for Section 3(c)(1) or Section 3(c)(7)
thereof, or an affiliated person of either of the foregoing. For purposes of this paragraph,
“affiliated person” means only those persons described in Section 2(a)(C)14,(D), E), and
(F) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, assuming for these purposes that a person
who would be an investment company but for Section 3(c)(1) or Section 3(c)(7) of the
Investment Company Act of 1940 is an investment company; or
Who is a holder of the issuer’s securities, under circumstances in which it is reasonably
foreseeable that the person will purchase or sell the issuer’s securities on the basis of the
information.
Paragraph (a) of this section shall not apply to a disclosure made:
To a person who owes a duty of trust or confidence to the issuer (such as an attorney,
investment banker, or accountant);
To a person who expressly agrees to maintain the disclosed information in confidence;
To an entity whose primary business is the issuance of credit ratings, provided the
information is disclosed solely for the purpose of developing a credit rating and the entity’s
ratings are publicly available; or
In connection with a securities offering registered under the Securities Act, other than an
13http://www.law.uc.edu/CCL/InvCoAct/sec3.html
14http://www.law.uc.edu/CCL/InvCoAct/sec2.html#a.3
128
offering of the type described in any of Rule 415(a)(1)(i) through (vi)15 under the Securities
Act (except an offering of the type described in Rule 415(a)(1)(i)16 under the Securities
Act also involving a registered offering, whether or not underwritten, for capital formation
purposes for the account of the issuer (unless the issuers offering is being registered for
the purpose of evading the requirements of this section)), if the disclosure is by any of the
following means:
A registration statement filed under the Securities Act, including a prospectus contained
therein;
A free writing prospectus used after filing of the registration statement for the offering or
a communication falling within the exception to the definition of prospectus contained in
clause (a) of section 2(a)(10) of the Securities Act; Any other Section 10(b) prospectus;
A notice permitted by Rule 13517 under the Securities Act;
A communication permitted by Rule 13418 under the Securities Act; or
An oral communication made in connection with the registered securities offering after
filing of the registration statement for the offering under the Securities Act.
Source:
Securities Lawyer’s Deskbook
Published by The University of Cincinnati College of Law
http://www.law.uc.edu/CCL/regFD/FD100.html
15http://www.law.uc.edu/CCL/33ActRls/rule415.html#a
16http://www.law.uc.edu/CCL/33ActRls/rule415.html#a.1.i
17http://www.law.uc.edu/CCL/33ActRls/rule135.html
18http://www.law.uc.edu/CCL/33ActRls/rule134.html
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APPENDIX D
The Engle-Granger Methodology
The Engle-Granger methodology suffers from several drawbacks. The method essentially
requires us to find the long-run equilibrium relationship between the integrated (assumed)
series and then test whether the residuals from this regression are stationary. That is, if we
have two non-stationary series {xt} and {yt} which we wish to test for cointegration, the
long-run equilibrium relation of the type yt = β0 + β1xt + εt is estimated. If the residual
series et obtained from the regression is stationary, then {xt} and {yt} are cointegrated of
order (1, 1). However, the choice of which variable should be designated as independent
or dependent introduces an element of arbitrariness. The problem is further exacerbated if
there are three or more variables. For example, if we have three non-stationary series {xt},
{yt} and {zt} then we can have the following long-run equilibrium relationships:
xt = β0 + β1yt + β2zt + ε1t (D.1)
yt = β3 + β4xt + β5zt + ε2t
zt = β6 + β7xt + β8yt + ε3t
Any of the three residual series would qualify for testing for a unit root. Moreover, there
may be conflicting results, i.e., one residual series may indicate cointegration while others
do not. Besides this, in the case of multiple cointegrating vectors, the Engle-Granger
methodology does not provide a systematic procedure for estimating them separately. Also,
130
the two-step procedure can carry over error from the first step to the next.
Johansen (1988) and Stock and Watson (1988) maximum likelihood estimators avoid
the two-step procedure. If {Xt} is an nx1 vector of I(1)variables and an autoregressive
relationship exists such that
Xt = µ+ A1Xt−1 + A2Xt−2 + . . .+ ApXt−p + εt, it can be rewritten as
∆Xt = ΠXt−1 +
p∑
i=1
Γi∆Xt−1 + εt
where Γi = (kxk) coefficient matrix with elements Γjk(i)t,
with Π =
p∑
i=1
Ai − I and Γi = −
p∑
j=i+1
Aj
The variables in {Xt} are cointegrated if the rank of Π is greater than zero. If Π is not full
rank, i.e., rank r < n then two n x r matrices α and β exist such that Π = αβ ′ and β ′Xt
is stationary. For a given r the maximum likelihood estimator of β defines the combination
of Xt that gives the r largest canonical correlations of ∆Xt l and Xt−1. Johansen suggests
testing these correlations with two likelihood ratio tests which in turn would be equivalent
to testing the rank of Π. These are the Trace and Max Eigen Value tests. The two statistics
are computed as
Jtrace = −T
n∑
i=r+1
ln
(
1− λˆi
)
(D.2)
Jmax = −T ln
(
1− λˆr+1
)
where T is the sample size and λˆi is the ith largest canonical correlation.
The Trace Test tests the null hypothesis that there are r cointegrating vectors against the
alternative hypothesis that there are n cointegrating vectors. The max Eigen Value Test
instead tests that there are r cointegrating vectors against the alternative hypothesis that
there are (r + 1) cointegrating vectors. There are some criticisms aimed at these tests also
(see Perron and Campbell (?)). In particular, the Johansen procedure cannot distinguish
nearly unit root variables and can overestimate the cointegrating rank.
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